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A Brief History of AIDS 
 
 The world first became aware of what is now called AIDS in 1981, when an 
increased number of relatively rare diseases was detected in gay men without any 
identifiable cause.1  The Center for Disease Control (CDC) formed a task force to 
study these opportunistic infections, and over time it was discovered that they all 
stemmed from what seemed to be a new disease, termed "Acquired Immune Defi-
ciency Syndrome" (AIDS) in August 1982.  In May 1983, researchers at the Pasteur 
Institute in France isolated a new virus which they believed caused AIDS.  The vi-
rus was named "lymphadenopathy-associated virus" (LAV), and samples were 
sent to the CDC and the National Cancer Institute (NCI), with which the Pasteur 
Institute collaborated to find the cause of AIDS.  In April 1984, the NCI announced 
that their Dr. Robert Gallo had identified the virus and had named it "human T-cell 
lymphotropic virus, type III" (HTLV-III).  Patent applications were filed both for 
the Pasteur Institute's and Dr. Gallo's work.  Private companies began developing 
commercial blood tests for AIDS, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
approved the first HIV antibody test in January 1985.  When the U.S. Patent Office 
refused to grant a patent on a test based on the research by the Pasteur Institute, 
the French scientists sued the NCI over who had first isolated the virus.  The case 
was ultimately settled, and the Pasteur Institute and the NCI agreed to share the 
credit for their discovery.  The name of the virus was subsequently changed to 
"Human Immunodeficiency Virus" (HIV). 
 
 In September 1986, early clinical tests showed that Azidothymidine (AZT), a 
drug first synthesized in 1964 to be used as chemotherapy for leukemia, slowed 
down the progress of the disease.  In 1987, AZT (Zivoduvine, Retrovir®) became 
the first anti-HIV drug to be approved by the FDA.  By then, AIDS had become 
sufficiently important to be discussed by the U.N. General Assembly, and on De-
                                                
1 The following account is based on "The History of AIDS", available at http://www.avert.org. 
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cember 1, 1988, the first World AIDS Day took place.  In 1990, the number of peo-
ple living with HIV/AIDS was estimated to be ten million worldwide.  In 1991, the 
second AIDS drug was approved by the FDA, and new drugs followed year after 
year.  These drugs are antiretroviral drugs, which are not a cure, but do slow down 
the reproduction of HIV in the body, thereby delaying the progression of the dis-
ease for many years.  They have proven to be quite effective, and by 1997, the 
number of AIDS deaths had declined significantly in the U.S.  The drugs are pat-
ented in the U.S. and marketed by pharmaceutical companies, in some instances as 
exclusive licensees of the U.S. government.  Patents relating to AIDS drugs were 
granted across the globe, including in South Africa (see Exhibit 1). 
 
 As of December 2003, more than twenty million people worldwide had died 
from AIDS, and another forty million people were living with HIV/AIDS.  There 
was an almost exponential growth of the epidemic in the early 1990s, particularly 
in Africa, which accounts for two-thirds of the people living with HIV/AIDS, 
while comprising only about eleven percent of the world's population (see Exhibit 
2).2  The uneven spread of the pandemic is aggravated by the fact that in those re-
gions of the world where the burden is highest, the coverage of antiretroviral 
treatment is lowest.  By the end of 2003, fewer than seven percent of people in de-
veloping countries in urgent need of antiretroviral treatment had access to these 
medicines (see Exhibit 3).3  The case of South Africa, economically the strongest 
African country, is particularly illustrative of this public health crisis and show-
cases the role domestic and international patent law and policy may play in this 
context. 
 
Health Care Reform in South Africa 
 
 South Africa, a country about twice the geographical size of Texas, has ap-
proximately forty-two million inhabitants, 75.2% of whom are black, 13.6% are 
white, 8.6% are of mixed race, and 2.6% are Indian.  Fifty percent of the population 
live in poverty, and the unemployment rate is 31%.4  The GDP was about 160 bil-
lion U.S. dollars in 2003 (10,880 billion U.S. dollars in the U.S.), while the GNI per 
capita was $2,780 ($37,610 in the U.S.) (see Exhibit 4). When Nelson Mandela, 
whose eldest son died of AIDS in January 2005, became President of South Africa 
after the first democratic elections in 1994, the country's health care system was 
based on a two-tiered approach.  Approximately 20% of the population, mostly 
white, was covered by private health care, while the black majority relied on public 
sector care characterized by "irrational use of resources, poor working conditions 
and inadequate infrastructure."5  Many South Africans did not have access to 
                                                
2 See WHO, World Health Report 1 (2004); UNAIDS, 2004 Report on the global AIDS epidemic 13, 23, 30 
(2004). 
3 See WHO, World Health Report 21 (2004); UNAIDS, 2004 Report on the global AIDS epidemic 101-102 
(2004). 
4 Source: CIA, The World Factbook, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook. 
5 South African Department of Health, National Drug Policy for South Africa 3 (1996). 
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health care at all, making health care reform one of the most important items on 
the agenda of the newly elected post-apartheid government, in line with the man-
date in their new Constitution to take reasonable measures to provide access to 
health care services for everyone.6  The new Minister of Health, Dr. Nkosazana 
Zuma, a native of Natal who had worked underground for the African National 
Congress (ANC) before spending years in exile, quickly appointed a National Drug 
Policy Committee to revamp South Africa's health care system.  After a series of 
investigations and consultations with stakeholders, including representatives of 
the pharmaceutical industry and the World Health Organization (WHO), the 
Committee found that among the most notable deficiencies were the lack of equity 
in access to essential drugs, the comparatively high prices for pharmaceuticals in 
the private sector, and the losses of drugs through poor security in the public sec-
tor.7  The price differential between the private and public sector was such that the 
private sector accounted for 80% of the country's total expenditures on drugs, de-
spite the fact that 60-70% of the total volume of pharmaceuticals were sold to the 
public sector.8  Furthermore, while a large amount of the public health budget was 
spent on prescription drugs, approximately 50% of the drugs in public hospitals 
were stolen and sold to the private sector, thus increasing the shortage of prescrip-
tion drugs in the public sector.9  The Committee finally released the revised Na-
tional Drug Policy in January 1996, setting forth a number of different objectives 
designed to address these issues, including lowering drug prices, supporting the 
development of a local pharmaceutical industry for the local production of essen-
tial drugs, and promoting the prescription of generic drugs in both the public and 
private sectors (see Exhibit 5).10 
 
South Africa's Approach to the AIDS Crisis 
 
 At the same time, South Africa was facing a tremendous increase in HIV in-
fection rates (see Exhibit 6), which further contributed to the magnitude of the 
public health problem.  South Africa rapidly became the country with the highest 
absolute number of people living with HIV/AIDS.  The overall adult prevalence 
rate approached the twenty percent mark, and approximately forty-five percent of 
military personnel were infected with HIV.11  However, with an average annual 
income of $2,600, most South Africans suffering from HIV/AIDS could not afford 
to pay for treatment with antiretroviral drugs, which at that time cost about $1,000 
a month.12  Life expectancy at birth dropped significantly (see Exhibit 7), and the 
number of orphans was increasing steadily (see Exhibit 8).  The impact of these 
                                                
6 See Articles 27(1)(a) and 27(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act. 108 of 1996. 
7 See South African Department of Health, National Drug Policy for South Africa 3 (1996). 
8 Id.(figures are for 1990). 
9 See, e.g., Donald G. McNeil Jr., South Africa's Bitter Pill for World's Drug Makers, New York Times, 
March 29, 1998, Section 3, p. 1. 
10 See South African Department of Health, National Drug Policy for South Africa 4, 10-11 (1996). 
11 See, e.g., Sabin Russell, New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs, The San Francisco Chronicle (May 24, 
1999), p. A1. 
12 See id. 
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demographic developments (see Exhibit 9) on South Africa's productivity could 
hardly be underestimated.  Nevertheless, while reforming the health care system 
was a top priority, the South African government initially remained rather passive 
in combating AIDS, and when it took action, it was widely criticized as ineffective.  
For example, the Ministry of Health authorized the spending of a large portion of 
the AIDS budget on the production of an AIDS awareness musical called "Sarafina 
II" and awarded the contract to one of Dr. Zuma's friends.  It later turned out that 
over one million dollars remained unaccounted for, and Dr. Zuma was accused of 
mismanagement.  Moreover, she promoted the use of Virodene, a locally produced 
AIDS treatment that contained an industrial solvent harmful to humans and that 
had not been approved by the Medicines Control Council (MCC) – the South Afri-
can equivalent of the FDA.13  Dr. Zuma also discontinued a program that provided 
pregnant women with AZT, because it was unaffordable.  It was not until AIDS 
activists close to the ANC met with Dr. Zuma and told her of their support for her 
battle against unreasonably high drug prices that she reversed her policy on AZT 
for pregnant women.14 
 
The Media Battle Over Drug Prices 
 
 It was precisely the South African government's emphasis on the reduction of 
drug prices that drew significant criticism from the pharmaceutical industry, and a 
media battle between the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Af-
rica (PMA) and the Minister of Health ensued.  The Minister of Health took the 
position that both the shortage of prescription drugs in the public sector and the 
exceptionally high prices in the private sector were the result of the pricing strate-
gies adopted by multinational pharmaceutical companies who held patents in 
South Africa on most antiretroviral drugs.15  The PMA opposed this position and 
claimed that their rates for the South African government were lower than those 
offered by international aid organizations and that any shortages in the public sec-
tor were due to the rampant theft of pharmaceuticals.16  Furthermore, the pharma-
ceutical companies denied that lowering drug prices would solve the access prob-
lem due to the fact that South Africa did not have an adequate infrastructure for 
the distribution of drugs, pointing to India as an example of a country where ac-
cess was and is an issue despite the availability of generic versions of AIDS 
drugs.17  In June 1997, the PMA filed a complaint with the Public Protector of 
South Africa (a neutral ombudsman with limited investigative and no sanctioning 
powers), alleging that certain officials from the Department of Health had made 
                                                
13 See, Donald G. McNeil Jr., South Africa's Bitter Pill for World's Drug Makers, New York Times, March 
29, 1998, Section 3, p. 1. 
14 See Mark Schoofs, AIDS – The Agony of Africa, Part 7, Village Voice (Dec. 28, 1999), p. 67. 
15 See Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS 
Treatment in Africa?, 286 No. 15 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 1886, 1888 (Oct. 17, 2001). 
16 See Transcript No. 98011205-212 of NPR Broadcast Show "All Things Considered" (January 12, 1998), 
available as audio stream at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1036870. 
17 See, e.g., Sabin Russell, New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs, The San Francisco Chronicle (May 24, 
1999), p. A1. 
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offensive statements in the news media to create "a perception in the minds of the 
general public that medicines in South Africa are unreasonably expensive and 
moreover that the blame for such expensive medicines lies with the manufacturing 
and primary importing companies."18  The PMA feared that this perception would 
lend support to legislation proposed by the Minister of Health on the express basis 
that drug prices in South Africa were unreasonably high compared to prices 
charged abroad.  The controversial legislative proposal contained the explicit 
authorization of parallel imports of patented pharmaceuticals.  It was drafted by 
Dr. Ian Roberts, a consultant to Dr. Zuma, and the language used was largely taken 
from a draft WIPO patent treaty.19  The proposal quickly passed a parliamentary 
subcommittee dominated by members of the ANC, the majority party to which Dr. 
Zuma belongs.  She also enjoyed strong support from President Mandela.  Ulti-
mately, a new Section 15C was inserted into the South African Medicines and Re-
lated Substances Control Act (MRSCA) (see Exhibit 10).  The primary purpose of 
this amendment was to enable South Africa to benefit from lower prices abroad for 
the same drugs. 
 
South Africa's Legislative Measures 
 
 Fearing a domino effect in the developing world, the U.S. pharmaceutical 
industry20, backed by the U.S. government, vigorously opposed the enactment of 
Section 15C, arguing that it was tantamount to a complete abrogation of patent 
rights and that it violated the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS).  As a representative of Bristol-Myers Squibb put it, "Pat-
ents are the lifeblood of our industry.  Compulsory licensing and parallel imports 
expropriate our patent rights," adding that the only beneficiary of the erosion of 
patents would be the generic drug industry.21  Nevertheless, the planned modifica-
tions, including Section 15C, were signed into law by President Nelson Mandela on 
December 12, 1997.22  In an attempt to block the implementation of the amend-
ments, the pharmaceutical companies took the matter to court and challenged the 
constitutionality of the amended MRSCA before the High Court of South Africa in 
February 1998.23  With respect to Section 15C, the plaintiffs argued (i) that it en-
                                                
18 See Public Protector of the Republic of South Africa, Report on the Propriety of the Conduct of Members 
of the Ministry and Department of Health Relating to Statements in Connection with the Prices of 
Medicines and Utilisation of Generic Medicines in South Africa, Special Report No. 6 (1997). 
19 See Frederick M. Abbott, WTO TRIPS Agreement and Ist Implications for Access to Medicines in Devel-
oping Countries, Study Paper 2a, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 53-54 (2002). 
20 Note that American subsidiaries accounted for 27% of the pharmaceutical market in South Africa, 
which was more than South African firms had; see Lynne Duke, Nkosazana Zuma – Activist Health 
Minister Draws Foes in S. Africa, Washington Post (December 11, 1998), p. A41. 
21 See, e.g., Sabin Russell, New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs, The San Francisco Chronicle (May 24, 
1999), p. A1. 
22 See Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act No. 90 of 1997, South African Govern-
ment Gazette No. 18,505 of December 12, 1997 (amending the Medicines and Related Substances Con-
trol Act No. 101 of 1965, as amended by Acts Nos. 65/1974, 17/1979, 20/1981 and 94/1991). 
23 See Notice of Motion in the High Court of South Africa (Transvaal Provincial Division), Case 
No. 4183/98. 
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tailed an impermissible delegation of powers from the legislative to the executive 
branch of government, because the Minister of Health was authorized to determine 
the application of patent rights irrespective of the South African Patents Act, and 
because she was authorized to determine the conditions for the supply of more 
affordable medicines without any limiting guidelines, (ii) that it would enable the 
Minister of Health to deprive intellectual property owners of their property with-
out compensation in violation of Article 25 of the South African Constitution, and 
(iii) that it was a violation of Art. 27 TRIPS and, because TRIPS binds South Africa, 
also a violation of Articles 44(4) and 231(2)-(3) of the South African Constitution.  
The South African government defended its new legislation on two grounds.  First, 
it claimed that Section 15C was constitutional, because it did not grant the Minister 
of Health broad powers to abrogate patent rights.  Second, it maintained that Sec-
tion 15C complied with TRIPS, arguing that TRIPS would not prohibit parallel im-
ports and that Section 15C did not address the controversial issue of compulsory 
licensing.24  Indeed, South Africa believed that it was being held to a "TRIPS plus" 
standard (a higher level of patent protection than required by TRIPS) both by the 
U.S. government and by the private plaintiffs in the lawsuit against Section 15C.25 
Procedurally, the constitutional challenge had the effect of a temporary stay of the 
implementation of the amended MRSCA. 
 
 While AIDS activists such as the South African Treatment Access Campaign 
(TAC) called for international protests against "drug profiteering" and claimed that 
delaying the implementation of the amended MRSCA would only cost additional 
lives, the pharmaceutical companies defended the court action on the grounds that 
"parallel importation of drugs would undermine the ability of pharmaceutical 
companies to charge different prices in different parts of the world" and that a 
"tiered pricing strategy allows wealthier countries to subsidize poorer ones, and 
the drug companies still get profits they need for research."26  Furthermore, a 
spokesman for the pharmaceutical companies was quoted as saying, "A lot of par-
allel imports come from places like India, and half the time there are no active in-
gredients.  It's killing patients, causing drug resistance and giving false hope."27  
The South African Minister of Health conceded to the pharmaceutical companies 
the ability to segment the market by charging different prices in different coun-
tries, but reserved the right to "purchase from a segment that suits our purse."28  
She also clarified that South Africa was not going after the profits of the drug com-
panies and suggested that what is lost in price could be made up in volume.29  She 
also rejected the charge that she wanted to abrogate patents and further stated, "I 
                                                
24 See WHO & WTO, WTO Agreements & Public Health 106 (2002). 
25 See Statement by the South African Delegation, Minutes of the Council for TRIPS Special Discussions on 
Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines, IP/C/M/31 (July 10, 2001), p. 27. 
26 357 The Lancet 775 (March 10, 2001). 
27 See Sabin Russell, World Trade Showdown, The San Francisco Chronicle (Nov. 24, 1999), p. A1. 
28 Lynne Duke, Nkosazana Zuma – Activist Health Minister Draws Foes in S. Africa, Washington Post 
(December 11, 1998), p. A41. 
29 See Steve Sternberg, Victims lost in battle over drug patents, USA Today (May 24, 1999), p. 2D. 
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think the lives of our people overrides everything else.  We are not intending to 
bust any patents.  We're not intending breaking any treaties.  All we want to do is 
to give health services to the people who are poor in this country, and to the peo-
ple who have been denied those health services for centuries."30  Nevertheless, the 
pharmaceutical companies viewed Section 15C as a threat to their business that 
went beyond its potential impact on the comparatively small South African mar-
ket.  They feared that the explicit authorization of parallel imports could set an ex-
ample for other countries. 
 
U.S. Reaction to South Africa's Legislative Measures 
 
 The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), a 
trade group representing the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, managed to convince 
the U.S. government that the issue was sufficiently important to warrant putting 
pressure on South Africa to repeal the contested legislative measures.  As a result, 
Section 15C was put on the agenda for high-level bilateral trade talks between the 
United States and South Africa (see Exhibit 11).  James Joseph, at that time U.S. 
Ambassador to South Africa, wrote a letter to representatives of the South African 
government, strongly urging South Africa to alter Section 15C and stating that "my 
Government opposes the notion of parallel imports of patented products anywhere 
in the world."31  South Africa was also put on the Special 301 "watch list"32 both in 
199833 and 199934 upon a determination by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) 
that South Africa lacked adequate intellectual property protection to an extent that 
merited bilateral attention.  Being on the watch list also meant that South Africa 
was one step closer to the imposition of unilateral trade sanctions by the United 
States.  In February 1998, forty-seven members of Congress sent a letter to the 
USTR calling for a response to the MRSCA, stating that Section 15C permitted par-
allel importation and allowed for the "administrative expropriation of patented 
technology," both of which would violate the TRIPS Agreement (see Exhibit 12).  
In July 1998, pending adequate progress on intellectual property rights protection 
in South Africa, the USTR used its discretion to withhold trade benefits for a range 
of South African products that had previously been approved under the General-
ized System of Preferences (GSP) program.35  Furthermore, a provision was in-
serted into an omnibus appropriations act in October 1998 that conditioned U.S. 
development assistance to South Africa on the Secretary of State's written report on 
the steps being taken by the U.S. government to work with South Africa "to negoti-
                                                
30 See Transcript No. 98011205-212 of NPR Broadcast Show "All Things Considered" (January 12, 1998), 
available as audio stream at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1036870. 
31 See South Africa's Health Committee Rejects MRSCA Bill Change, Pharma Marketletter (October 21, 
1997). 
32 See 19 U.S.C. § 2411. 
33 See 10 No. 6 J. Proprietary Rts. 19 (June 1998). 
34 See 1999 USTR Special 301 Report (also stating that "South Africa's Medicines Act appears to grant the 
Health Minister ill-defined authority to issue compulsory licenses, authorize parallel imports, and po-
tentially otherwise abrogate patent rights"). 
35 See Simon Barber, U.S. Withholds Benefits Over Zuma's Bill, Africa News (July 15, 1998). 
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ate the repeal, suspension, or termination" of Section 15C.36  The Department of 
State submitted this report in February 1999, stating that all relevant agencies of 
the U.S. government "have been engaged in an assiduous, concerted campaign" to 
persuade South Africa to withdraw or modify Section 15C which the State De-
partment believed was "inconsistent" with South Africa's obligations and commit-
ments under TRIPS.37  Despite this assessment, which mirrored statements made 
by PhRMA38, the U.S. did not bring a WTO case against South Africa. 
 
Shift in U.S. Foreign Trade Policy 
 
 During 1999, the high stakes of the controversy between the United States 
and South Africa attracted a great deal of attention in the media, which ultimately 
led to a shift in the U.S. Administration's policy towards South Africa.  The fact 
that Vice President Al Gore, as co-chairman of the United States/South Africa Bi-
national Commission (established to improve communication and cooperation be-
tween the two countries), had been actively involved in pressuring South Africa to 
give in to the demands of the pharmaceutical industry, seems to have been particu-
larly important, as he became one of the main targets of AIDS activists who had 
long urged the U.S. government to change its policy towards South Africa.  AIDS 
activists – realizing that the 2000 Presidential campaign made Gore particularly 
vulnerable to negative publicity – disrupted a number of his campaign events 
shouting "Gore's greed kills", including the event where he announced that he 
would be running for President.  Ralph Nader openly attacked him for engaging in 
"an astonishing array of bullying tactics to prevent South Africa from implement-
ing policies, legal under international trade rules, that are designed to expand ac-
cess to HIV/AIDS drugs."39  These actions further increased public awareness of 
the conflict between the pharmaceutical industry and developing countries. 
 
 Meanwhile, Rep. Jesse Jackson, Jr., (D-Ill.) had introduced the HOPE for Af-
rica Bill that contained a provision drafted by AIDS activists that called upon the 
U.S. government not to "seek, through negotiation or otherwise, the revocation or 
revisions of any sub-Saharan African intellectual property or competition law or 
policy that is designed to promote access to pharmaceuticals or other medical 
technologies" and that complies with TRIPS.40  In June 1999, Gore replied to a letter 
sent to him by the Chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus, James E. Clyburn, 
inquiring into the issue of affordable medicines for South Africa.  In his letter, Gore 
indicated that U.S. policy may change by saying that he supported South Africa in 
                                                
36 See Pub. L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-155 (1998). 
37 See United States Department of State Report on U.S. Government Efforts to Negotiate the Repeal, Ter-
mination or Withdrawal of Article 15(C) of the South African Medicines and Related Substances Act of 
1965 (February 5, 1999). 
38 See, e.g., South African/US Patent War Continues, Pharma Marketletter (April 1, 1998). 
39 Ralph Nader, Al Gore bullies South Africa on U.S.-made AIDS drugs, Knight Ridder/Tribune (April 26, 
1999). 
40 See HOPE for Africa Bill, H.R. 772, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., § 601 (1999). 
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its efforts to provide AIDS drugs at reduced prices through compulsory licensing 
and parallel importing, as long as they were carried out in a manner consistent 
with international agreements (see Exhibit 13).  In July 1999, the House Committee 
on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Human Resources and 
Drug Policy, took up the issue and held hearings on the role of the United States in 
combating the global HIV/AIDS epidemic, for the first time inviting consumer 
advocates to express their views on U.S. foreign trade policy regarding patent pro-
tection and public health. 
 
 In September 1999, the USTR and the South African government announced 
that the controversy was resolved and that the U.S. government would no longer 
pressure South Africa, and in return, South Africa promised to adhere to its obliga-
tions under TRIPS.41  Consequently, South Africa was taken off the Special 301 
watch list.  At about the same time, the plaintiffs in the MRSCA case announced 
the suspension of their lawsuit against the South African government.42  In a 
speech given at the 1999 WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle, President Clinton 
made it clear that the United States would adjust its trade policies to enable poor 
countries, such as South Africa, to gain access to essential medicines.  On May 10, 
2000, he formally ordered that "the United States shall not seek, through negotia-
tion or otherwise, the revocation or revision of any intellectual property law or pol-
icy of a beneficiary sub-Saharan African country […] that regulates HIV/AIDS 
pharmaceuticals or medical technologies" and prohibited the U.S. Government 
from taking action pursuant to Section 301 with respect to laws or policies that 
promote access to HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals or medical technologies and that 
provide adequate and effective intellectual property protection consistent with 
TRIPS.43  In February 2001, the Bush Administration reaffirmed that the United 
States would not raise any objection if WTO Members taking steps to address ma-
jor health crises "availed themselves of the flexibility" afforded by TRIPS.44  
Moreover, in April 2001, the pharmaceutical companies dropped their court chal-
lenge of Section 15C and agreed to cover the South African government's legal ex-
penses in the face of what has been described as a public relations nightmare.45  
The talks behind the scenes leading to the withdrawal involved Kofi Annan, the 
Secretary General of the United Nations, who was contacted by Jean-Pierre Gar-
nier, the CEO of GlaxoSmithKline, on behalf of the largest pharmaceutical compa-
nies to broker a deal with Thabo Mbeki, the President of South Africa.  Both the 
                                                
41 See Robert Weissman, AIDS Drugs for Africa, 20 No. 9 Multinational Monitor 9 (1999). 
42 See Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Industry to Drop AIDS Drug Lawsuit Against South Africa, New York Times 
(Sept. 10, 1999), p. A3. 
43 See Exec. Order No. 13,155, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,521 (May 12, 2000), §§ 1(a) and 3(a). 
44 See Statement by the U.S. Delegation, Minutes of the Council for TRIPS Special Discussions on Intellec-
tual Property and Access to Medicines, IP/C/M/31 (July 10, 2001), pp. 33-34. 
45 As some journalists put it, "Can the pharmaceuticals industry inflict any more damage upon its ailing 
public image?  Well, how about suing Nelson Mandela?"; Helene Cooper et al., AIDS Epidemic Puts 
Drug Firms In a Vise: Treatment vs. Profits, Wall Street Journal (March 2, 2001). 
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European Union and the WHO supported South Africa's position.46  As part of the 
deal, South Africa reiterated its pledge to comply with TRIPS when implementing 
the amendments to the MRSCA and invited the pharmaceutical industry to help 
draft future regulations.47 
 
 The withdrawal of the lawsuit was welcomed by most commentators, includ-
ing Mike Moore, the Director General of the WTO, who said that the "settlement" 
was a "win-win situation" for all stakeholders.  While pharmaceutical companies 
stressed South Africa's commitment to protect patents, AIDS activists celebrated 
the withdrawal as a direct result of their efforts to create negative publicity for the 
pharmaceutical companies by pitching the conflict as one of putting profits before 
people.  Indeed, as Garnier put it, "We're a very major corporation.  We're not in-
sensitive to public opinion.  That is a factor in our decision-making.  We don't want 
the public to misunderstand the issues.  We have never been opposed to wider ac-
cess.  We have discounted our drugs.  We've done everything we could.  Frankly, 
the legislation was the worst distraction.  It did not allow us to communicate our 
message effectively."48  The question of profits for pharmaceutical companies was 
also raised during Merck's Q1 Earnings Release Conference Call, when Laura Jor-
dan, Senior Director of Investor Relations at Merck, was asked about the potential 
impact of the withdrawal and of Merck's price reductions for its AIDS drugs, Crix-
ivan and Stocrin, on Merck's profits.  She answered that Merck had indeed an-
nounced that it would not profit in the sale of those medicines in the developing 
world, but that Merck's new prices - $600 per patient per year for Crixivan, and 
$500 for Stocrin – would not lead to lost sales, because "the sales of these medicines 
in the developing world were virtually nonexistent" and that the new sales would 
be "incremental sales."49  With respect to price reductions, however, the new South 
African Minister of Health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, cautioned that the with-
drawal of the lawsuit would not mean that South Africa would provide low-cost 
drugs immediately, because "the country's medical infrastructure is insufficient."50  
In any event, the controversial provisions of the amended MRSCA could finally 
take effect.  When the MRSCA was modified again in 200251, Section 15C was left 
untouched. 
 
The Doctrinal Issues – Parallel Importation and Compulsory Licensing 
 
                                                
46 See Rachel L. Swarns, Drug Makers Drop South Africa Suit Over AIDS Medicine, The New York Times 
(April 20, 2001), p. A1. 
47 See Ann M. Simmons, Firms Clear Way for Cheaper AIDS Drugs, Chicago Tribune (April 20, 2001), p. 4. 
48 See Rachel L. Swarns, Drug Makers Drop South Africa Suit Over AIDS Medicine, The New York Times 
(April 20, 2001), p. A1. 
49 See Q1 2001 Merck Earnings Conference Call, Transcript 042001ap.732, FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire (April 
20, 2001). 
50 See Susan Warner, AIDS drug lawsuit dropped in S. Africa, The Dallas Morning Star (April 20, 2001), 
p. 1A. 
51 See Medicines and Related Substances Amendment Act No. 59 of 2002, South African Government 
Gazette No. 24,279 of January 17, 2003. 
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 From the standpoint of international patent law, the key legal issue underly-
ing the South African controversy was whether the explicit authorization of paral-
lel imports of patented pharmaceuticals in Section 15C complied with TRIPS.  Note 
that the South African Patents Act, which had just been brought into compliance 
with TRIPS in 1997,52 granted the patentee the exclusive right to import patented 
products,53 but was (and still is) silent on the issue of whether this right is subject 
to national or international exhaustion.  During the conflict between the U.S. and 
South Africa, three different views were expressed on the legality of parallel im-
ports: 
 
 (1) Representatives of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry claimed that 
authorizing parallel imports of patented drugs plainly violates the patent holder's 
exclusive right of importation prescribed by Article 28 TRIPS and is not covered by 
the exceptions set forth in Articles 30 and 31 TRIPS.54  The U.S. government shared 
this view but provided a more subtle legal explanation of its position by saying 
that while there is no question that Article 6 TRIPS denies WTO Members the abil-
ity to avail themselves of dispute settlement in relation to most questions involving 
parallel imports, Article 6 TRIPS does not authorize parallel imports, because it 
"does not alter the substantive obligations of the TRIPS Agreement, particularly 
those contained in Part II of the Agreement."55  The U.S. did not explain whether 
the footnote in Article 28 TRIPS (explicitly stating that the rights under Article 28 
TRIPS are "subject to the provisions of Article 6") had an impact on its analysis. 
 
 (2) South Africa took the position that the issue of parallel imports is a mat-
ter left to the individual WTO Member State to decide.  Most countries and com-
mentators agree with South Africa that Article 6 TRIPS is based on a country-by-
country approach to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights and parallel im-
ports.  This view is based on a plain reading of the TRIPS Agreement as well as on 
its drafting history.  Although the issue of parallel imports was discussed by the 
TRIPS negotiators, they failed to reach a consensus on the subject, precisely be-
cause developing countries favored international exhaustion while the U.S. advo-
cated national exhaustion (and the European Union tried to preserve the principle 
of EU-wide exhaustion). 
 
                                                
52 See Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act No. 38 of 1997, South African Government Gazette No. 
18,325 of October 1, 1997 (amending, inter alia, the South African Patents Act No. 57 of 1978). 
53 § 45(1) South African Patents Act No. 57/1978, as amended, reads: "The effect of a patent shall be to 
grant to the patentee in the Republic, subject to the provisions of this Act, for the duration of the patent, 
the right to exclude other persons from making, using, exercising, disposing or offering to dispose of, or 
importing the invention, so that he or she shall have and enjoy the whole profit and advantage accruing 
by reason of the invention." 
54 See, e.g., the Submission of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) for 
the National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE) 1999 (December 4, 1998). 
55 See Statement by the U.S. Delegation, Minutes of the Council for TRIPS Special Discussions on Intellec-
tual Property and Access to Medicines, IP/C/M/31 (July 10, 2001), p. 40. 
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 (3) Some international trade scholars suggest a third position.56  While ac-
knowledging that Article 6 TRIPS does not settle the issue one way or another, 
they argue that Article 6 is limited to TRIPS ("nothing in this Agreement") and that 
some rules in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1994 may be 
read as mandating the adoption of an international exhaustion regime.  More spe-
cifically, outlawing parallel imports may be viewed as a non-tariff trade barrier in 
violation of Article XI:1 of GATT 1994 and as a form of discrimination in favor of 
domestically produced goods that violates the principle of national treatment con-
tained in Article III of GATT 1994.  It is controversial whether parallel imports 
would qualify under a general exception contained in Article XX(d) of GATT 1994. 
 
 The second important issue that was raised in the context of the dispute over 
South Africa's amendment to the MRSCA relates to compulsory licensing.  It ap-
pears that, at the time the MRSCA was enacted, the  South African government did 
not intend to expand the government's ability to grant compulsory licenses beyond 
what was already provided in South Africa's patent law.57  However, compulsory 
licensing was brought to the forefront of the international debate about intellectual 
property and public health policy in January 1998, after the Executive Board of the 
World Health Assembly adopted a resolution urging the member states to put 
public health above commercial interests and to review their options under TRIPS 
to safeguard access to essential drugs.58  This resolution triggered a series of heated 
discussions on the subject over the course of various meetings held at the WHO, 
during which representatives of the South African government made statements 
that included compulsory licensing as an option for increasing access to essential 
drugs.59  The possibility that South Africa could resort to compulsory licensing was 
of major concern to pharmaceutical companies holding patents covering AIDS 
drugs and was rapidly becoming the most important issue in international negotia-
tions, particularly in view of the fact that Brazil had already set a precedent for 
compulsory licensing. 
 
 In 1996, in order to alleviate the AIDS crisis, Brazil had amended its Industrial 
Property Law to establish a "local working" requirement enabling the Brazilian 
government to grant compulsory licenses if a patent is not "worked" in Brazil.60  In 
June 2000, the U.S. initiated WTO dispute settlement proceedings against Brazil, 
alleging that the recent amendment was inconsistent with the principle of non-
discrimination set forth in Articles 27 and 28 TRIPS.61  Brazil, in return, requested 
                                                
56 See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, First Report (Final) To The Committee On International Trade Law Of The 
International Law Association on the Subject of Parallel Importation, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 607, 632-33 (1998). 
57 See, e.g., §§ 55, 56, 78, 79 South African Patents Act No.57 of 1978. 
58 World Health Assembly, Executive Board, 101st Sess., Resolution No. EB101/R.24, Revised Drug Strat-
egy (January 27, 1998). 
59 See e-mail dated November 27, 2004, from James Love, Director, Consumer Project on Technology, to 
William W. Fisher (on file with authors). 
60 See Article 68 of Law No. 9,279 of May 14, 1996, effective May 1997. 
61 See U.S. Request for Consultations, WT/DS199/1 (June 8, 2000). 
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consultations under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)62, claiming 
that certain provisions in the U.S. Patent Act governing "Patent Rights in Inven-
tions Made with Federal Assistance" violated the TRIPS Agreement, because they 
required products embodying specific inventions to be "manufactured substan-
tially in the United States."63  Facing growing international criticism, the U.S. with-
drew its complaint in July 2001, just a few months after the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission had declared that the "right of everyone to the enjoyment of the high-
est attainable standard of physical and mental health is a human right" based on a 
draft resolution provided by Brazil.64  The U.S. and Brazil jointly notified the WTO 
of a Mutually Agreed Solution, in which Brazil agreed to hold prior talks with the 
U.S. government should Brazil deem it necessary to apply the provisions in ques-
tion to grant compulsory licenses on patents held by U.S. companies.65 
 
 While the dispute between Brazil and the U.S. focused on the application of 
the principle of non-discrimination, the South African controversy centered around 
the question of whether it would be compatible with Articles 30 and 31 TRIPS for a 
WTO member state to grant compulsory licenses to lower drug prices to combat 
AIDS.  Articles 30 and 31 TRIPS set forth the conditions for the validity of a domes-
tic compulsory licensing scheme.  To the extent that such scheme does not "unrea-
sonably conflict with the normal exploitation of the patent" and does not "unrea-
sonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner," it is legal under Ar-
ticle 30 TRIPS.66  If these general requirements are not met, however, the compul-
sory licensing mechanism is only permissible if it complies with the detailed pre-
requisites listed in Article 31 TRIPS.  In the South African context, the pharmaceu-
tical companies feared that the Minister of Health could use the amended MRSCA 
to bypass these provisions to their detriment and to the benefit of South African 
manufacturers of generic drugs. 
 
The Policy Issue –Legislative Flexibility under TRIPS 
 
 The significance of the South African controversy goes beyond doctrinal is-
sues.  It touches upon the more fundamental question of to what extent WTO 
Member States – in this context, primarily developing countries – should be free to 
take legislative measures to deal with public health crises and to what extent the 
patent protection of pharmaceuticals required under TRIPS should limit the range 
of options available.  Developing countries consider both parallel imports and 
compulsory licensing as tools to bring down drug prices, which they view as the 
                                                
62 See Brazilian Request for Consultations, WT/DS224/1 (February 7, 2001). 
63 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 204, 209 (2004). 
64 U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Access to Medication in the Context of Pandemics such as 
HIV/AIDS, Resolution No. 2001/33, Doc. No. E/CN.4/RES/2001/33 (April 23, 2001). 
65 See Joint Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, WT/DS199/4 (July 19, 2001). 
66 For instance, in a case brought by the European Union against Canada, a WTO Panel decided that Can-
ada's "pre-expiration testing" exemption was consistent with Article 30 TRIPS, while its "stockpiling" 
exemption was not; see WTO Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, 
WT/DS114/R (March 17, 2000). 
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most important obstacle to enhancing access to essential medicines.67  Pharmaceu-
tical companies in the developed world, with the aid of their governments, resist 
legislation that threatens the strength of their patents, fearing that they will not be 
able to recoup the investments they have made to develop AIDS drugs and that 
they will lose business to manufacturers of generics located in the developing 
world.  The South African experience brought the potential tension between patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals and public health concerns to the forefront of public 
awareness and triggered a global debate about what should be allowed and what 
should be prohibited under TRIPS in order to preserve the incentives for invest-
ments in research and development of pharmaceuticals, while still allowing coun-
tries the flexibility to respond to public health crises as they deem fit.  In this con-
text, one provision at the intersection between parallel imports and compulsory 
licensing garnered a great deal of attention.  Article 31(f) TRIPS requires that the 
use of a patent for which a compulsory license has been granted be "predominantly 
for the supply of the domestic market."  In practice, this means that if a country 
grants a compulsory license to make a patented pharmaceutical without authoriza-
tion from the patent holder, the drugs manufactured under this compulsory license 
cannot be exported to another country.  The result is that developing countries 
without manufacturing capabilities cannot benefit from the compulsory licenses 
allowed under TRIPS, because they cannot manufacture the pharmaceuticals 
themselves and because they cannot import pharmaceuticals manufactured abroad 
under a compulsory license.  This rule is likely to become more important as more 
developing countries with manufacturing capacity will provide patent protection 
for pharmaceuticals pursuant to the transitional rules imposed by TRIPS. 
 
 At the initiative of the African Group of WTO Members, of which South Af-
rica was a part, the concerns outlined above were discussed within the framework 
of the WTO and put on the agenda of the Fourth Ministerial Conference, held in 
Doha, Qatar, in November 2001.  At the end of the conference, the WTO Member 
States adopted the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health ("Doha 
Declaration")68 (see Exhibit 14), acknowledging the gravity of the public health 
problems afflicting many developing countries and recognizing both the impor-
tance of intellectual property protection for new medicines and the concerns about 
its effects on drug prices.  Many factors may have made it possible for the Doha 
Declaration to pass, but commentators usually point to three factors.69  First, the 
developing countries were united and acted as one group.  Second, the previously 
firm traditional views adopted by the United States and other Western countries 
                                                
67 See Statement by the Delegation of Tanzania, Minutes of the Council for TRIPS Special Discussions on 
Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines, IP/C/M/31 (July 10, 2001), p. 30. 
68 WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (November 20, 2001).  See also Section 6 of the Ministerial Declaration adopted on 
November 14, 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (November 20, 2001).  In terms of its legal status, the Doha 
Declaration has interpretive force as "subsequent practice" in the application of TRIPS in the sense of 
Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
69 See, e.g., Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines – A Long Way 
From Seattle to Doha, 3 Chi. J. Int. L. 27, 42-43 (2002). 
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were not easy to maintain given the reaction by both Canada and the United States 
to the potential shortage of Ciprofloxacine (Cipro) during the anthrax scare.  Both 
countries were quick to express their readiness to override patents on Cipro held 
by Bayer, a German pharmaceutical company, if the situation could not be solved 
to their satisfaction – a move opposed by PhRMA.  Third, a large number of AIDS 
activists and non-governmental organizations made sure that the issue received a 
great deal of publicity.  The final version of the Doha Declaration was ultimately 
negotiated between Brazil and the United States. 
 
 In terms of its content, the Doha Declaration strives to reconcile the TRIPS 
Agreement with efforts of WTO Member States to protect public health by reaf-
firming their right to use "the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide 
flexibility for this purpose" (Article 4).  In Article 5, the Doha Declaration addresses 
the issues mentioned above and clarifies that each WTO Member (i) has the right 
to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon 
which such licenses are granted, (ii) has the right to determine what constitutes a 
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency (the HIV/AIDS 
crisis is explicitly recognized as a case of emergency or urgency), and (iii) is free to 
establish its own patent exhaustion regime without challenge (and thus free to al-
low parallel imports).  In Article 7, the deadline for providing patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals was extended for least-developed countries until 2016,70 while the 
deadline for developing countries pursuant to Article 65(4) TRIPS was not ex-
tended, remaining at 2005. 
 
 The Doha Declaration also recognized that WTO Members with insufficient 
or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties 
in making effective use of compulsory licensing under TRIPS.  As a result, the 
Council for TRIPS was instructed to find an "expeditious solution" to this problem 
(Article 6 of the Doha Declaration).  A series of negotiations ensued, and a number 
of solutions were proposed.  The developing countries – initially supported by the 
European Union – favored a solution based on a general exception under domestic 
patent law in line with Article 30 TRIPS.  The United States opposed this approach 
from the very beginning and proposed either a waiver solution or – preferably – a 
simple moratorium on dispute settlement.  A formal amendment to Article 31(f) 
TRIPS could have also been an option, but it would probably have proven to be too 
cumbersome and time-consuming to come to an agreement as to the precise word-
ing of an amendment.  In addition, the United States clearly preferred a transitory 
or provisional solution that would not touch the TRIPS Agreement.  The WTO 
Member States managed to agree on a waiver solution, but the negotiations never-
theless stalled in December 2002, as the WTO Member States failed to agree on the 
precise wording of a waiver provision.  In particular, the United States feared that 
the disease scope was too broadly defined (expanding beyond those to treat infec-
                                                
70 This article was implemented through a Council for TRIPS decision.  See Council for TRIPS, Decision of 
June 27, 2002, IP/C/25 (July 1, 2002). 
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tious diseases into the area of "lifestyle drugs" such as Viagra®) and that drugs 
sold cheaply to meet the needs of developing countries could be diverted and re-
exported to high price countries in the developed world.71  Further negotiations – 
sometimes directly between representatives of U.S. pharmaceutical companies and 
developing countries – ultimately led to the WTO Decision of August 30, 2003 (see 
Exhibit 15)72. 
 
 The approach chosen was to waive the obligations set forth in Article 31(f) 
TRIPS (supply for domestic market) for countries exporting pharmaceuticals to 
certain eligible countries, and to waive the obligations under Article 31(h) TRIPS 
(adequate remuneration) for eligible importing countries, which in turn must take 
appropriate measures to prevent trade diversion.73  Assuming that the relevant 
pharmaceuticals are patented in the countries in question, this system requires two 
compulsory licenses, one in the importing country and another in the exporting 
country.  The mechanism applies to all pharmaceutical products, but is intention-
ally ambiguous as to the disease scope.  Any WTO Member State qualifies as an 
exporting country, and any WTO Member State may qualify as an importing coun-
try, as long as it can show that it has insufficient manufacturing capacities, which 
are assessed on a product-by-product basis.  As of October 2004, no notifications 
had been made to the Council for TRIPS74, but some reports indicate that the Ma-
laysian government has granted compulsory licenses to Cipla, an Indian generic 
manufacturer, for AIDS drug patents held by Bristol-Myers Squibb and GlaxoS-
mithKline,75 and that Zambia has granted a compulsory license to Pharco Ltd., an 
Italian company incorporated in Zambia, to manufacture a combination of three 
AIDS drugs covered by patents held by Boehringer Ingelheim and Bristol-Myers 
Squibb.  Under the terms of the license, the royalties due to the patent holders are 
limited to 2.5% of the total turnover generated by Pharco Ltd.76 
 
Developments Outside WTO and TRIPS 
 
 Since South Africa introduced Section 15C in 1997 to reduce the cost of pre-
scription drugs, a number of efforts have been made by a variety of actors to make 
access to antiretroviral treatment more affordable for people in developing coun-
tries.  In May 2000, five U.N. organizations – UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO, UNAIDS, 
                                                
71 See Paul Vandoren & Jean Charles Van Eeckhaute, The WTO Decision on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Dec-
laration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health – Making it Work, 6 J. World Intell. Prop. 780-781 
(2003). 
72 WT/L/540 (September 2, 2003). 
73 In legal terms, the WTO Decision rests on Articles IV:1 and IV:2 of the Agreement establishing the 
WTO, and the waivers contained in Articles 2, 3, and 6 are based on Article IX:3 of the WTO Agree-
ment. 
74 The WTO maintains a Web site dedicated to notifications under the WTO Decision; see 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_e.htm. 
75 See Latha Jishnu & Gina S. Krishnan, The Cipla Test of Para 6, Businessworld (India) (March 8, 2004). 
76 See Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Commerce, Trade, and Industry, Compulsory License No. DC 
01/2004, Doc. No. MCT1/104/1/1c (Sept. 21, 2004); see also The Times of Zambia (Sept. 23, 2004). 
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and the World Bank – initiated the Accelerating Access Initiative (AAI), a partner-
ship with five major pharmaceutical companies (Boehringer Ingelheim, Bristol-
Myers Squibb, GlaxoSmithKline, Merck, F. Hoffmann-La-Roche, and Abbott Labo-
ratories) to further reduce the cost of HIV/AIDS drugs.  Within the framework of 
this Initiative, the drug companies provide antiretroviral drugs to countries in the 
developing world at a significant discount, in some instances at 10-20% of the price 
charged in developed countries.  Some companies have also made their drugs 
available to recipients outside the AAI, such as nongovernmental organizations, 
private sector employers and health care organizations.77  As a result, prices for 
antiretroviral treatment in developing countries have decreased sharply (see Ex-
hibit 16).  At the same time, funding to fight HIV/AIDS has been increased.  In 
2000, at a meeting of the G8 countries, Japan suggested the creation of a global 
fund to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.  The idea was promoted by 
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and approved by the U.N. General Assembly 
in June 2001.  The Global Fund was established in January 2002 and is funded by 
governments, private organizations, and individuals worldwide (see Exhibit 17).  
As of October 2004, more than $3 billion has been donated to the Global Fund, and 
about $650 million has been disbursed worldwide.  Yet, when Senator Norm 
Coleman (R-MN), member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, visited 
South Africa in August 2003, the situation in terms of access to essential medicines 
did not seem to be much better, "It is a country in which there are 11 million or-
phans from AIDS, over 5 million people are HIV positive. And yet with 5 million 
people being HIV positive only 20,000 are receiving the anti-retro viral drug that is 
needed to treat AIDS and descend its tide."78 
 
 Since this statement was released, further efforts have been made to cut prices 
on both diagnostics and drugs to combat HIV/AIDS.  The most notable of these 
efforts is South Africa's cooperation with the William J. Clinton Presidential Foun-
dation, which provides technical and financial assistance to implement South Af-
rica's first comprehensive treatment plan approved in November 2003.  The goal is 
to provide treatment to more than three million people within a few years, with 
more than a million of those receiving antiretroviral treatment.79  To this end, the 
Clinton Foundation managed to reach agreements with five suppliers of generic 
antiretroviral drugs to reduce the price of the most commonly used drug therapy 
combinations to less than $140 per person per year.80  One of these suppliers is the 
South African generic manufacturer Aspen Pharmacare, whose stock price jumped 
to new heights when the deal was announced, despite the fact that it agreed to 
keep its profit margins low (see Exhibit 18).  In January 2004, the Clinton Founda-
tion struck deals with the market leaders for diagnostics to reduce prices by up to 
80% as compared to the then current market prices.  As of April 2004, the Clinton 
                                                
77 See WHO & UNAIDS, Accelerating Access Initiative – Progress Report (June 2002). 
78 Norm Coleman, Audio Update (August 22, 2003), available at http://coleman.senate.gov. 
79 See http://www.clintonpresidentialcenter.org/country.php?c=SouthAfrica. 
80 See http://www.clintonpresidentialcenter.org/aids-initiative4a.htm. 
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Foundation also works with the Global Fund, the World Bank, and UNICEF to ex-
tend access to its pricing for drugs and diagnostics to countries in which these or-
ganizations are active.81 
 
Latest Developments in South Africa 
 
 The latest news from South Africa relates to the conclusion of investigations 
of pricing practices by pharmaceutical companies conducted by the South African 
Competition Commission.  The investigations were triggered by complaints and 
private lawsuits filed independently by manufacturers of generics and by public 
interest groups dissatisfied with the price reductions that occurred during 2001 
and worried that the public pressure on pharmaceutical companies would decline 
if the issue were left to private negotiations between the drug industry, generic 
manufacturers, and the government.  The ultimate goal of these complaints and 
lawsuits was and still is to enable or increase generic competition for name-brand 
antiretroviral drugs, either by imposing compulsory licenses or by encouraging 
voluntary licenses.  The first case was settled in December 2003 after the South Af-
rican Competition Commission found GlaxoSmithKline (Glaxo) and Boehringer 
Ingelheim in violation of antitrust laws by reason of excessive pricing and refusal 
to license their patents to certain generic manufacturers (see Exhibit 19).  More 
precisely, they had refused to license their patents to generic manufacturers other 
than Aspen Pharmacare.  Under the settlements, reached prior to the beginning of 
hearings before the Competition Tribunal, the two companies allow select generic 
companies to manufacture and sell some of their antiretroviral drugs in sub-
Saharan Africa in return for a royalty that does not exceed 5% of net sales of the 
relevant antiretroviral drugs (as opposed to the 30% and 15% royalties Glaxo and 
Boehringer charged Aspen Pharmacare prior to the settlement). 82  The public in-
terest organizations hope that the combined annual prices for AZT, 3TC, and Nevi-
rapine will drop from $3,000 at the time the complaint was filed to $300 after the 
implementation of the settlements.83  A similar case brought against Glaxo by the 
U.S.-based AIDS Healthcare Foundation was not settled, however, despite the fact 
that Glaxo, in June 2003, had agreed to provide the AIDS clinic run by AIDS 
Healthcare with antiretroviral drugs at not-for-profit prices.  The case was referred 
to the Competition Tribunal in August 2004, but, as of January 2005, no decision 
had been reached.84  The proceedings before the Competition Tribunal are just a 
new chapter in an ongoing battle between Glaxo and the AIDS Healthcare Founda-
tion that includes challenges of Glaxo's U.S. patents, petitions to revoke FDA ap-
proval for one of Glaxo's drugs, and a class action lawsuit against Glaxo on behalf 
                                                
81 See http://www.clintonpresidentialcenter.org/aids-initiative5.htm. 
82 See The Guardian (London), October 17, 2003, p. 23. 
83 See, e.g., John Donnelly, Deal Paves Way for Generic HIV Drug Companies to Allow Sales in Sub-
Saharan Africa, The Boston Globe (December 11, 2003), p. A8. 
84 See In the Matter of Mpho Mkhathnini et al. and GlaxoSmithKline (Pty) Ltd. et al., Case No. 
34/CR/Apr04; see also John Carvel, New Aids Drug Battle for Glaxo, The Guardian (London) (August 
21, 2004), p. 5. 
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of AIDS patients who allege that Glaxo's illegal pricing strategy is responsible for 
their not having access to life-saving medicines (see Exhibit 20). 
 
Reflections on the South Africa Controversy by the CEO of Novartis 
 
 In October 2004, the CEO of Novartis, Dr. Daniel Vasella, became the new 
president of the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and 
Associations (IFPMA), replacing the CEO of Merck, Ray Gilmartin.  On this occa-
sion, Dr. Vasella gave an interview to a Swiss newspaper, discussing the question 
of how the pharmaceutical industry could improve its declining reputation.85  
When asked what went wrong in the industry over the past twenty-five years, 
Vasella responded86, "This is in part the consequence of the continuously increas-
ing costs of health care, which are attributed to drug prices, even though they only 
make up about 15% of health care costs.  Much more important than drug prices is 
the fact that the number of elderly people, who are sick more often, increases con-
stantly.  Another incisive change followed from the AIDS epidemic.  This was the 
first time – at least in my recollection – when the pharmaceutical companies were 
confronted with self-organized AIDS patients.  The conflict was about who would 
get access to the first effective anti-AIDS-drug and how much the company would 
be allowed to charge for life-saving treatment.  In this discussion, the pharmaceuti-
cal companies took a very traditional position.  This was a mistake."  However, 
Vasella rejected the idea that it was patent protection that was at the core of the 
issue by saying, "The debate about patents emerged under the impression that pat-
ents would prevent access to life-saving medicines for poor patients.  People forgot 
that patents are a fundamental condition for obtaining the financial means to pay 
for research and development.  But again – instead of developing timely alterna-
tives with partners, the industry behaved defensively." 
 
 
                                                
85 See NZZ am Sonntag (Zurich), pp. 47-48 (October 31, 2004). 
86 The following statements were translated from German by Cyrill Rigamonti. 
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Exhibit 1 
 
 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF AIDS DRUGS 
 
 
Generic Name Brand Name FDA Marketing Firm U.S. Patent Holder SA Pat. 
Zidovudine (AZT) Retrovir 1987 GlaxoSmithKline Burroughs Wellcome Yes 
Didanosine (ddI) Videx 1991 Bristol-Myers Squibb United States Yes 
Zalcitabine (ddC) Hivid 1992 Roche United States No 
Stavudine (d4T) Zerit 1994 Bristol-Myers Squibb Yale University Yes 
Lamivudine (3TC) Epivir 1995 GlaxoSmithKline IAF Biochem Int'l Yes 
Abacavir Sulfate Ziagen 1998 GlaxoSmithKline Burroughs Wellcome Yes 
Sequinavir Mesylate Invirase 1995 Roche Roche Yes 
Saquinavir Fortovase 1997 Roche Roche Yes 
Ritonavir Norvir 1996 Abbott Laboratories Abbott Laboratories No 
Indinavir Sulfate Crixivan 1996 Merck & Co. Merck & Co. Yes 
Nelfinavir Mesylate Viracept 1997 Pfizer Pfizer Yes 
Amprenavir Agenerase 1999 GlaxoSmithKline Vertex Yes 
Nevirapine Viramune 1996 Boehringer Ingelheim Boehringer Ingelheim Yes 
Delavirdine Mesylate Rescriptor 1997 Pfizer Pfizer Yes 
Efavirenz Sustiva 1998 Bristol-Myers Squibb Merck & Co. Yes 
 
Sources: Consumer Project on Technology (http://www.cptech.org); Amir Attaran & Lee 
Gillespie-White, Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment 
in Africa?, 286 No. 15 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 1886, 1888 (2001); U.S. Food and Drug Admini-
stration, Orange Book (http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm) 
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Exhibit 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WHO, World Health Report 2 (2004) 
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Exhibit 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WHO, World Health Report 22 (2004) 
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Exhibit 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank; data available at http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query 
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Exhibit 5 
 
 
 
 
NATIONAL DRUG POLICY FOR SOUTH AFRICA (1996) 
 
(excerpt of objectives relating to drug pricing) 
 
 
4. Drug pricing 
 
AIM 
 
To promote the availability of safe and effective drugs 
at the lowest possible cost 
 
This aim will be achieved by monitoring and negotiating drug prices and by ra-
tionalising the drug pricing system in the public and private sectors, and by pro-
moting the use of generic drugs. 
 
4.1 Rationalization of the pricing structure 
 
! A Pricing Committee with clearly defined functions to monitor and regulate drug 
prices will be established within the Ministry of Health. Committee members will 
include health economists, pharmacoeconomists, representatives from the De-
partment of Finance, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Procurement Unit 
of the Department of Health, the Department of State Expenditure, and consumer 
representatives. 
 
! There will be total transparency in the pricing structure of pharmaceutical manu-
facturers, wholesalers, providers of services, such as dispensers of drugs, as well as 
private clinics and hospitals. 
 
! A non-discriminatory pricing system will be introduced and, if necessary, en-
forced. 
 
! The wholesale and retail percentage mark-up system will be replaced with a pric-
ing system based on a fixed professional fee. 
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! All drugs at the primary care level will be supplied free of charge. At the secon-
dary and tertiary levels a fixed affordable co-payment for drugs supplied by the 
State will be levied. A system of exemption will be established for patients without 
the resources to meet such payment to ensure that they are not deprived of treat-
ment. 
 
! A data base will be developed to monitor the cost of drugs in the country in com-
parison with prices in developing and developed countries. 
 
! Price increases will be regulated. 
 
! Where the State deems that the retail prices of certain pharmaceuticals are unac-
ceptable and that these pharmaceuticals are essential to the well being of any sector 
of the population, the State will make them available to the private sector at acqui-
sition cost plus the transaction costs involved. 
 
4.2 The use of generic drugs 
 
The use of interchangeable multi-source pharmaceutical products (IMPP), using 
the international non-proprietary name (INN), or generic name, is a recommended 
step to reduce drug costs and expenditure. It also contributes to a sound system of 
procurement and distribution, drug information and rational use at every level of 
the health care system. 
 
! The availability of generic, essential drugs will be encouraged through the im-
plementation of incentives that favour generic drugs and their production in the 
country. 
 
! The policy will aim at achieving generic prescribing in both the public and private 
sectors. Until this aim is achieved, generic substitution will be allowed, through 
legislation, in the public and the private sector. It will be incumbent on the phar-
macist, prior to dispensing a prescription, to inform the patient on the benefits of 
generic substitution and to ensure that substitution takes place with the patient’s 
full understanding and consent. 
 
! Patients have the right to make informed decisions concerning their own health, 
including a choice for generic drugs. 
 
! A regularly updated list of products that cannot be substituted will be prepared 
and disseminated by the MCC. 
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Exhibit 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: International Programs Center, Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau, 
HIV/AIDS Surveillance Data Base, June 2000 
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Exhibit 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the 
United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision and World 
Urbanization Prospects: The 2001 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp 
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Exhibit 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNAIDS/UNICEF/USAID, Children on the Brink 8, 10 (2004) 
 
 
 
Source: Monitoring the AIDS Pandemic (MAP), The Status and Trends of the HIV/AIDS 
Epidemics in the World 20 (Provisional Report, 1998) (based on data collected by CINDI, 
South Africa) 
 
Fisher & Rigamonti South Africa Case Study 
 
 
 
 
- 29 - 
 
 
 
Exhibit 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNAIDS, 2004 Report on the global AIDS epidemic 43 (2004) 
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Exhibit 10 
 
 
 
 
SOUTH AFRICAN MEDICINES AND 
RELATED SUBSTANCES CONTROL AMENDMENT ACT OF 1997 
 
(excerpt from Section 10) 
 
 
Measures to ensure supply of more affordable medicines 
 
15C. The Minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable 
medicines in certain circumstances so as to protect the health of the public, and in 
particular may — 
 
(a) notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Patents Act, 1978 
(Act No. 57 of 1978), determine that the rights with regard to any medicine 
under a patent granted in the Republic shall not extend to acts in respect of 
such medicine which has been put onto the market by the owner of the medi-
cine, or with his or her consent; 
 
(b) prescribe the conditions on which any medicine which is identical in compo-
sition, meets the same quality standard and is intended to have the same 
proprietary name as that of another medicine already registered in the Re-
public, but which is imported by a person other than the person who is the 
holder of the registration certificate of the medicine already registered and 
which originates from any site of manufacture of the original manufacturer as 
approved by the council in the prescribed manner, may be imported; 
 
(c) prescribe the registration procedure for, as well as the use of, the medicine 
referred to in paragraph (b). 
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Exhibit 11 
 
 
 
 
The New York Times 
March 29, 1998, Sunday, Late Edition 
Section 3; Page 1; Column 1 
 
South Africa's Bitter Pill for World's Drug Makers 
 
By Donald G. McNeil, Jr. (Johannesburg) 
 
(excerpt) 
 
 
 AMERICANS who need to visit a doc-
tor here notice it right away: the price of the 
appointment is a pleasant surprise, far less 
than it would be in the United States. But the 
prescription afterward is a shock – sometimes 
double the charge for the doctor's time. 
 
 The national Health Department says 
South Africans, most of whom live in poverty, 
pay some of the highest drug prices in the 
world. But its effort to force down prices has 
set off a pitched battle between the Health 
Minister – a doctor and Zulu princess named 
Nkosazana Zuma – and the powerful global 
pharmaceutical industry. The stakes are so 
high that President Clinton put the dispute on 
his agenda last week during a stop in South 
Africa on his six-nation African tour. 
 
 At issue is a new law that gives Dr. 
Zuma sweeping powers to open the country 
to cheap imports, encourage the use of gener-
ics and sharply curb the markups that phar-
macists charge. 
 
 The law is crucial to the mission the 
new Government has assigned her: to turn 
inside out a health care system that has given 
high-quality care to whites while forcing most 
blacks to wait in crowded public hospitals or 
turn to traditional healers. Not only have pre-
scription drugs consumed a huge portion of 
the public health budget, but half of all drugs 
in public hospitals are stolen, winding up in 
the high-priced private sector. At the hospi-
tals, meantime, the cupboards are so bare that 
some provincial doctors said recently that 
they could no longer give AIDS patients ex-
pensive antibiotics for brain infections. 
 
 None of this, however, is why President 
Clinton cares about what has come to be 
known as the Zuma law. Rather, American 
pharmaceutical companies, which control 
nearly half of the $2 billion-a-year drug mar-
ket here through subsidiaries, see it as a threat 
to their patent rights. 
 
 They say the law -- which was signed in 
December and is now tied up in a court battle 
over its enforcement -- seems to arm Dr. Zuma 
with the power to undo international patent 
protections and give anyone here she chooses 
the green light to make pirate versions of pre-
scription drugs. 
 
 If the law is allowed to stand, the com-
panies worry that other countries will follow 
suit. And why stop with drugs? American 
companies have billions in other intellectual 
property to protect -- from movies to music to 
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software -- and the principles involved are 
essentially the same. 
 
 "If the Health Minister thought it was in 
the interest of public health that those $10,000 
AIDS cocktails be cheaper, she could just rip 
off the patents and set up a factory in Cape 
Town to make them," said a Western diplomat 
who is fighting the law. "And if the Minister of 
Health says this is O.K., then the Minister of 
Education will be able to say, 'Well, affordable 
computers are in the interest of public educa-
tion, but Windows is just too darn expensive, 
so we're going to buy knockoff copies.' " 
 
 The Health Ministry denies having any 
such designs, and insists that it is only trying 
to cut prices. "The minister has said constantly 
that we have no intention of abrogating patent 
rights," said Dr. Ian Roberts, a British consult-
ant to Dr. Zuma who drafted the new law. 
"We respect the fact that they have an eco-
nomic value." 
 
 On Thursday, Commerce Secretary 
William M. Daley, visiting with Mr. Clinton, 
discussed the American objections to the law 
with Dr. Zuma. Both continue to disagree, a 
diplomat said, about the meaning of the sec-
tion of the law that the pharmaceutical com-
panies and the United States Government say 
they cannot live with. 
 
 In this battle, it is hard to spot the good 
guys – or even a neutral player. There is no 
consumer lobby here, no Ralph Nader or Con-
sumer Reports magazine, so patients are at the 
mercy of big business and big government. 
The local press has been lax, dutifully retyping 
the propaganda from both sides without ex-
plaining the issues to nervous readers. And 
there has been more than enough brinkman-
ship to go around. 
 
 Merck & Company, the New Jersey-
based drug giant, has dropped a $10 million 
investment, openly blaming the new law. 
Britain's SmithKline-Beecham said it was re-
thinking expansion plans. Since the legislation 
was introduced last May, Bristol-Myers 
Squibb, Pharmacia & Upjohn and Eli Lilly 
have all closed their South African factories. 
While they didn't openly blame the bill, the 
closures "were partly in response to uncer-
tainty surrounding the legislation," acknowl-
edged Mirryena Deeb, executive director of 
the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association 
of South Africa. 
 
 In Washington, 47 members of Con-
gress recently signed a letter asking the 
United States trade representative to "pursue 
all appropriate action" against the law. 
 
 And an industry group, the Pharmaceu-
tical Research and Manufacturers of America, 
lumping South Africa with Argentina and 
India as "global centers of patent piracy," 
asked the Commerce Department to put all 
three on Washington's highest-level list of 
countries that discriminate against American 
exports -- the first step toward imposing sanc-
tions. (South Africa got off the list only two 
years ago, when the Government helped stop 
a Durban hamburger outlet from stealing the 
McDonald's name.) 
 
 The South African Government, on its 
side, is threatening to bypass the pharmaceu-
tical companies and import cheaper drugs. If 
drugs don't get less expensive, Dr. Roberts 
said, Pretoria could up the ante by mandating 
the use of generics or even directly setting 
drug prices. 
 
 The battle is greatly affected by the 
quirky, stubborn personality of Dr. Zuma, 
whose husband is a power broker in the rul-
ing African National Congress party. More 
important, Dr. Zuma enjoys the absolutely 
bulletproof support and affection of President 
Nelson Mandela. 
 
 The dispute is also bitter, and driven by 
deep suspicions. Virtually everyone inter-
viewed quietly suggests – off the record – that 
the other side is hatching a plot. Some exam-
ples: The Health Ministry is the tool of a 
World Health Organization cabal that thinks 
patents on medicines are unethical – or a tool 
of Indian pharmaceutical companies that want 
new markets for their pirate products. The 
A.N.C. health specialists are Marxists who 
want revenge on multinationals that evaded 
sanctions in the apartheid era. The American 
drug companies are being misled by their 
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local subsidiaries, which have formed cozy 
cartels to keep profits up. 
 
 The two sides disagree even about 
whether medicines here are cheap or expen-
sive, and they interpret the same words in the 
law differently. A great deal will depend on 
how Dr. Zuma enforces the law. That is, as-
suming it withstands a pending challenge in 
the courts here and a threatened one before 
the World Trade Organization, and that the 
Government doesn't bend to American and 
European pressure to amend it. 
 
* * * 
 
 The Government says that drugs here 
are exceedingly expensive. For example, the 
same drugs in pharmacies in next-door Zim-
babwe are frequently half the price or less, 
because many are Zimbabwe-made generics. 
Prices in New York can also be cheaper. A 
tablet of Amoxicillin, a commonly prescribed 
antibiotic, sells for 50 cents here, compared 
with 30 cents in New York and just 4 cents in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
 Dr. Roberts, the health ministry con-
sultant, did his own study in 1996 of drug 
expenditures as a percentage of gross domes-
tic product. It showed South Africa as No. 2 in 
the world, after Portugal. 
 
 But the South African drug makers' 
association replies that public hospitals, which 
buy 80 percent of the nation's drugs, pay rock-
bottom prices through competitive bidding. 
Its studies show public-sector prices equal to 
or below those obtained by international aid 
agencies. The problem, the drug makers say, 
has to do only with the other 20 percent of the 
drugs, earmarked for private pharmacies and 
"dispensing doctors." 
 
 These two views are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Nor is it the case that the 
high prices affect only the well-to-do. The 
poor are victims because the huge profits 
available in the private sector leach drugs off 
hospital shelves, forcing patients at times to 
do without or to pay more. 
 
 The drug makers blame the distributors 
for this situation. The drugstore industry has 
long had a cartel arrangement typical in South 
Africa -- wholesalers mark up about 21 per-
cent and pharmacies mark up 50 percent 
more. (In the United States, the distribution 
chain typically marks prices up only 25 per-
cent, pharmaceutical makers said.) Drugstores 
don't post prices and there are no discount 
chains. 
 
 Dr. Roberts calls the 50 percent markup 
a "perverse incentive" to sell the most expen-
sive drug. The new law authorizes replacing 
the markup with dispensing fees that will 
result in the same modest profit on a cheap 
prescription as on a costly one. 
 
 But the most important change in the 
law is probably the simplest: Pharmacists 
must tell customers when a cheaper generic 
exists, and must sell that medicine unless the 
doctor or the patient forbids it. (As elsewhere 
in the world, 95 percent of the most commonly 
prescribed drugs here have generic equiva-
lents.) 
 
 The law also forbids manufacturers 
from offering cash, vacations or other incen-
tives to doctors who prescribe their drugs. 
And it requires doctors who sell drugs, often 
as a lucrative sideline, to get licenses to do so. 
 
 The figures are disputed, but some ex-
perts estimate that fewer than 20 percent of 
prescriptions here are for generics, compared 
with more than 50 percent in Britain and the 
United States. 
 
* * * 
 
 FEARS, real or otherwise, are also at the 
center of the fighting over so-called parallel 
imports. Typically, a multinational company 
makes the same pills in several factories 
around the world, then designates which lots 
go to which countries, setting different prices 
in each. South Africa wants to buy a drug 
wherever it is cheapest. "That's free trade, isn't 
it?" said a World Health Organization doctor. 
 
* * * 
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 TWO adorable 3-year-old orphans in 
the nursery at the Cotlands Baby Sanctuary 
and Hospice here drop their lunch bowls as a 
visitor enters to run and hug his knees. Like 
many HIV-positive children, they have swol-
len glands below their ears, but otherwise 
seem healthy and happy. Minutes later, the 
head nurse, Kathy Volkwyn, almost bursts 
into tears as she answers a whispered ques-
tion. "Yes," she says, "these babies are proba-
bly all going to die." 
 
 For Cotlands, the cost of drugs is an 
enormous issue. The anti-AIDS cocktail that 
could keep the children alive costs an un-
thinkable $1,000 a month. Cotlands -- which 
by South African standards is quite good at 
fund-raising -- can barely pay the $40 a month 
it takes to treat each child's ear infections with 
Ciprobay, a patented antibiotic for which no 
generic exists. 
 
 "We have a hard time paying for milk 
and nappies," said Reva Goldsmith, the assis-
tant director. "Many medicines become out of 
the question." 
 
 Dr. Zuma's law may bring at least some 
of those medicines within reach. But things 
could definitely get worse if the dispute with 
the big drug companies goes too far. 
 
 The companies are most upset at one 
scrap of a phrase in Paragraph 15C(a) of the 
law. "To protect the health of the public," it 
says, the Health Minister may approve the use 
of more affordable drugs, "notwithstanding 
anything to the contrary contained within the 
Patents Act," a reference to the 1978 Patents 
Act of South Africa, which binds the country 
to international patent protections. 
 
 Drug companies, members of Congress, 
the American ambassador here and some 
European governments have all told the South 
African Government that they think the para-
graph abrogates all patent rights. 
 
 MR. ZUMA says it does not, but she 
adamantly refuses to change the wording. The 
Government's official position is that the pro-
vision only authorizes parallel imports. Paral-
lel importing honors patents, even if it snubs 
the patent holder's right to control worldwide 
prices. 
 
 Feeling increasingly threatened, the 
drug makers are becoming increasingly 
threatening, openly hinting that they may 
refuse to sell here their future discoveries for 
treating AIDS or cancer. 
 
 Asked if the companies were literally 
threatening to let people die if the law stands, 
Mrs. Deeb, of the local manufacturers' associa-
tion, hemmed a bit, then answered: "In so 
many words, yes. It's very clear – when coun-
tries start tampering with patent rights, the 
new innovations aren't released there." 
 
 Drug makers shun India, she said, cit-
ing a hypertension drug that must be con-
sumed immediately upon unwrapping, before 
sunlight begins to make it toxic. In India, she 
said, it is sold on the street in jars. "If they 
can't control how it's made and sold, they 
won't sell," she said. "They can't afford the 
liability lawsuits." 
 
 Asked if such harsh threats were really 
a wise tactic, she answered: "Health is a very 
emotive topic. When one party is totally un-
reasonable, the other becomes totally unrea-
sonable. It becomes tit-for-tat. It's playground 
tactics, I'm afraid." 
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Exhibit 12 
 
 
 
February 2, 1998 
 
Ms. Charlene Barshefsky 
United States Trade Representative 
600 17th Street 
Washington, D.C.  20508 
 
Dear Ms. Barshefsky: 
 
 We are writing to urge that the Administration respond to a law recently enacted by 
the Government of South Africa which effectively abrogates the intellectual property 
rights of foreign pharmaceutical companies operating in South Africa. These rights are 
guaranteed by the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), to which South Africa is a signatory. 
 
 The new law contains at least two egregious provisions. First, it permits the parallel 
importation of patented products and second, it allows for the administrative expropria-
tion of patented technology. 
 
 Both provisions are violations of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 28 of the Agreement 
obligates member countries to prohibit parallel imports of patented products and Article 
27 prohibits discrimination on the enjoyment of patent rights based on the field of technol-
ogy. 
 
 As South Africa seeks to establish itself in the world market, it needs the assistance 
of the international community to create jobs and economics opportunity. Weakening in-
tellectual property protection in any field is certain to lessen, rather than enhance South 
Africa's ability to attract vitally needed foreign direct investment. 
 
 We hope to work with the South African government in its pursuit of equitable so-
cial reforms, including those within the health sector. However, the implications of this 
law are so great that in the absence of its repeal, we must urge you to pursue all appropri-
ate actions, including if necessary with the WTO. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Congressman Bob Menendez (D-NJ), Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Africa 
Congressman Edward Royce (R-CA), Chairman, House Subcommittee on Africa 
Senator Bob Toricelli (D-NJ) 
Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) 
Congressman Chris Smith (R-NJ) 
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Congressman Howard Coble (R-NC) 
Congressman Tom Lantos (D-CA) 
Congressman Rodney Frelinghuysen (R-NJ) 
Congressman Frank Pallone (D-NJ) 
Congressman Donald Payne (D-NJ) 
Congressman Bob Franks (R-NJ) 
Congressman Jim McDermott (D-WA) 
Congressman Scott Klug (R-WI) 
Congressman Rob Andrews (R-NJ) 
Congressman Steve Rothman (D-NJ) 
Congressman Ken Calvert (R-CA) 
Congressman Steve Chabot (R-OH) 
Congressman Mark Sanford (R-SC) 
Congressman Bill Pascrell, Jr. (D-NJ) 
Congressman Carrie Meek (D-FL) 
Congressman Sam Gejdenson (D-CT) 
Congressman James Traficant (D-OH) 
Congressman Dan Burton (R-IN) 
Congressman Gary Ackerman (D-NY) 
Congressman Brad Sherman (D-CA) 
Congressman Eni Faleomavaega (D-AS) 
Congressman Gerald Solomon (R-NY) 
Congressman Martin Frost (D-TX) 
Congressman Elton Gallegly (R-CA) 
Congressman Frank LoBiondo (R-NJ) 
Congressman John Hostettler (R-IN) 
Congressman John Peterson (R-PA) 
Congressman Merill Cook (R-UT) 
Congressman Jim Davis (D-FL) 
Congressman John Porter (R-IL) 
Congressman Edolphus Towns (D-NY) 
Congressman Jim Saxton (R-NJ) 
Congressman David Price (D-NC) 
Congressman David Drier (R-CA) 
Congressman Don Manzullo (R-IL) 
Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney (D-NY) 
Congressman Stephen Horn (R-CA) 
Congressman Robert Wexler (D-FL) 
Congresswoman Julia Carson (D-IN) 
Congressman Michael Pappas (R-NJ) 
Congresswoman Juanita Millender-McDonald (D-CA) 
Congressman Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) 
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Exhibit 13 
 
 
 
June 25, 1999 
 
The Honorable James E. Clyburn 
Chairman, Congressional Black Caucus 
U.S. House of Representatives 
Washington, DC 20515 
 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
 
 Thank you for your letter on behalf of the Congressional Black Caucus inquiring into 
the issue of affordable AIDS medicines in South Africa. I share with the Caucus an abiding 
interest and affection for the people of South Africa and of Africa as a whole, and I am 
happy to bring you abreast of developments in our efforts to resolve our differences with 
South Africa over trade in pharmaceuticals. 
 
 I want you to know from the start that I support South Africa's efforts to enhance 
health care for its people --including efforts to engage in compulsory licensing and parallel 
importing of pharmaceuticals -- so long as they are done in a way consistent with interna-
tional agreements. 
 
 As you know all too well, AIDS has reached epidemic proportions in South Africa. 
More than three million South Africans are HIV positive, and the virus is spreading at an 
astonishing, horrifying speed -- infecting more than a thousand people a day. AIDS is tear-
ing apart communities and wiping out families, turning wives into widows and children 
into orphans. At the current pace, more than 2.5 million South African children will lose 
both parents to AIDS in the next ten years. And the financial means to battle the crisis is 
itself a casualty; South Africa's economic growth is slowed by 1 percent each year due to 
the impact of HIV/AIDS. 
 
 That is why I put the issue of AIDS at the top of my agenda during my trip to Cape 
Town last February for a session of the U.S-South Africa Binational Commission. Then-
Deputy President Thabo Mbeki and I had a lengthy discussion on the crisis. He has 
launched an important campaign of awareness and prevention, but he knows he needs to 
provide effective treatment to those for whom prevention is no longer an option. 
 
 In 1997, in an effort to enhance health care for all South Africans, the National As-
sembly passed amendments to the Medicines Act that granted the government broad, but 
unspecified authority to provide more affordable drugs to its people. Out of concern that 
this new law might be used in ways that violate patent rights, more than 40 pharmaceuti-
cal firms -- about one third from South Africa, one third from Europe, and one third from 
Fisher & Rigamonti South Africa Case Study 
 
 
 
 
- 38 - 
the U.S. -- challenged the law in South African courts, claiming the law violates the South 
African Constitution. After more than a year, that case is still pending. 
 
 Clearly, there is a global consensus on the need to protect intellectual property. That 
is why the 134 nations of the WTO concluded the WTO/TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights) agreement to establish international standards for intellectual 
property protection. 
 
 The Administration has shared its own concerns with South Africa over the more 
vague provisions of the Medicines Act. We have asked the Government of South Africa to 
clarify the actions it would take under the Act, and assure us the actions would comply 
with international agreements and not undermine legal protections for patent holders. 
 
 Under her independent authority mandated by Congress, the United States Trade 
Representative named South Africa to the "watch list" during her Special 301 Annual Re-
view in 1998. Naming a country to the "watch list" -- the lowest designation in the review -
- triggers no sanctions or threat of sanctions, but calls for bilateral efforts to resolve the 
issue. It is also important to note that naming South Africa to the watch list was not done 
solely in response to pharmaceuticals, but extended to other issues, including protections 
for computer software, CDs, and other intellectual property. 
 
 As you may know, the pharmaceutical industry recommended this year that South 
Africa be elevated two levels to the designation "Priority Foreign Country." Such a desig-
nation would have required the Government of South Africa to resolve this issue to the 
USTR's satisfaction within a set time, or face trade sanctions. I believe that such an action 
would have undercut our cooperative efforts to resolve this issue with South Africa, and I 
urged the USTR to reject the industry recommendation. In the end, USTR maintained 
South Africa on the "watch list," where it had been the previous year. 
 
 In my meeting with then-Deputy President Mbeki here in Washington in August of 
last year, he and I agreed to seek a solution that addressed the need to bring better health 
care to South Africans and, at the same time, account for the legitimate interests of manu-
facturers. I proposed to then-Deputy President Mbeki that -- to speed the availability of 
lower-cost pharmaceuticals in South Africa -- we work toward a resolution within a 
framework that included parallel importing and compulsory licensing, consistent with 
international agreements. 
 
 Our efforts to resolve the issue have been slowed by the ongoing litigation, but my 
view is the same now as it was then: I support South Africa's effort to provide AIDS drugs 
at reduced prices through compulsory licensing and parallel importing, so long as they are 
carried out in a way that is consistent with international agreements. 
 
 During our meeting in Cape Town in February of this year, then-Deputy President 
Mbeki and I again reviewed the issue and agreed to continue our efforts to resolve our 
differences. I am confident that we will reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. 
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 Meanwhile, I thank you for your support of the U.S.-South Africa friendship, and for 
the commitment of the Congressional Black Caucus to confront the growing crisis of AIDS 
in Africa. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Al Gore 
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Exhibit 14 
 
 
 
 
World Trade Organization WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 
20 November 2001 Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session 
Doha, 9 – 14 November 2001 (01-5860) 
 
 
DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
 
Adopted on 14 November 2001 
 
1. We recognize the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many developing 
and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria and other epidemics. 
 
2. We stress the need for the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) to be part of the wider national and international ac-
tion to address these problems. 
 
3. We recognize that intellectual property protection is important for the development 
of new medicines.  We also recognize the concerns about its effects on prices. 
 
4. We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from 
taking measures to protect public health.  Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment 
to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health and, 
in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. 
 
 In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO Members to use, to the full, the 
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose. 
 
5. Accordingly and in the light of paragraph 4 above, while maintaining our commit-
ments in the TRIPS Agreement, we recognize that these flexibilities include: 
 
(a) In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, 
each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object 
and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and 
principles. 
 
(b) Each Member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to 
determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted. 
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(c) Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emer-
gency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that 
public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, ma-
laria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circum-
stances of extreme urgency. 
 
(d) The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the ex-
haustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each Member free to estab-
lish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the MFN 
and national treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4. 
 
6. We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities 
in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory 
licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.  We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expe-
ditious solution to this problem and to report to the General Council before the end of 
2002. 
 
7. We reaffirm the commitment of developed-country Members to provide incentives 
to their enterprises and institutions to promote and encourage technology transfer to least-
developed country Members pursuant to Article 66.2.  We also agree that the least-
developed country Members will not be obliged, with respect to pharmaceutical products, 
to implement or apply Sections 5 and 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement or to enforce 
rights provided for under these Sections until 1 January 2016, without prejudice to the 
right of least-developed country Members to seek other extensions of the transition peri-
ods as provided for in Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.  We instruct the Council for 
TRIPS to take the necessary action to give effect to this pursuant to Article 66.1 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. 
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Exhibit 15 
 
 
 
 
World Trade Organization WT/L/540 
2 September 2003  
 (03-4582) 
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE DOHA DECLARATION ON 
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
 
Decision of 30 August 2003 
 
 The General Council, 
 
 Having regard to paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization ("the WTO Agreement"); 
 
 Conducting the functions of the Ministerial Conference in the interval between meet-
ings pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article IV of the WTO Agreement; 
 
 Noting the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
(WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2) (the "Declaration") and, in particular, the instruction of the Minis-
terial Conference to the Council for TRIPS contained in paragraph 6 of the Declaration to 
find an expeditious solution to the problem of the difficulties that WTO Members with 
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face in mak-
ing effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement and to report to the 
General Council before the end of 2002; 
 
 Recognizing, where eligible importing Members seek to obtain supplies under the 
system set out in this Decision, the importance of a rapid response to those needs consis-
tent with the provisions of this Decision; 
 
 Noting that, in the light of the foregoing, exceptional circumstances exist justifying 
waivers from the obligations set out in paragraphs (f) and (h) of Article 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement with respect to pharmaceutical products; 
 
 Decides as follows: 
 
1. For the purposes of this Decision: 
                                                
 This Decision was adopted by the General Council in the light of a statement read out by the Chairman, 
which can be found in JOB(03)/177.  This statement will be reproduced in the minutes of the General 
Council to be issued as WT/GC/M/82. 
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(a) "pharmaceutical product" means any patented product, or product manufac-
tured through a patented process, of the pharmaceutical sector needed to ad-
dress the public health problems as recognized in paragraph 1 of the Declara-
tion.  It is understood that active ingredients necessary for its manufacture and 
diagnostic kits needed for its use would be included87; 
 
(b) "eligible importing Member" means any least-developed country Member, and 
any other Member that has made a notification88 to the Council for TRIPS of its 
intention to use the system as an importer, it being understood that a Member 
may notify at any time that it will use the system in whole or in a limited way, 
for example only in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.  It is noted that 
some Members will not use the system set out in this Decision as importing 
Members89 and that some other Members have stated that, if they use the sys-
tem, it would be in no more than situations of national emergency or other cir-
cumstances of extreme urgency; 
 
(c) "exporting Member" means a Member using the system set out in this Decision 
to produce pharmaceutical products for, and export them to, an eligible im-
porting Member. 
 
2. The obligations of an exporting Member under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement 
shall be waived with respect to the grant by it of a compulsory license to the extent neces-
sary for the purposes of production of a pharmaceutical product(s) and its export to an 
eligible importing Member(s) in accordance with the terms set out below in this para-
graph: 
 
(a) the eligible importing Member(s)90 has made a notification2 to the Council for 
TRIPS, that: 
 
(i)  specifies the names and expected quantities of the product(s) needed91; 
 
(ii) confirms that the eligible importing Member in question, other than a 
least-developed country Member, has established that it has insufficient 
or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector for the 
product(s) in question in one of the ways set out in the Annex to this De-
cision;  and 
                                                
87 [Fn. 1] This subparagraph is without prejudice to subparagraph 1(b). 
88 [Fn. 2] It is understood that this notification does not need to be approved by a WTO body in order to 
use the system set out in this Decision. 
89 [Fn. 3] Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
90 [Fn. 4] Joint notifications providing the information required under this subparagraph may be made by 
the regional organizations referred to in paragraph 6 of this Decision on behalf of eligible importing 
Members using the system that are parties to them, with the agreement of those parties. 
91 [Fn. 5] The notification will be made available publicly by the WTO Secretariat through a page on the 
WTO website dedicated to this Decision. 
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(iii) confirms that, where a pharmaceutical product is patented in its terri-
tory, it has granted or intends to grant a compulsory license in accor-
dance with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement and the provisions of this 
Decision92; 
 
(b) the compulsory license issued by the exporting Member under this Decision 
shall contain the following conditions: 
 
(i) only the amount necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing 
Member(s) may be manufactured under the license and the entirety of 
this production shall be exported to the Member(s) which has notified its 
needs to the Council for TRIPS; 
 
(ii) products produced under the license shall be clearly identified as being 
produced under the system set out in this Decision through specific la-
belling or marking.  Suppliers should distinguish such products through 
special packaging and/or special colouring/shaping of the products 
themselves, provided that such distinction is feasible and does not have a 
significant impact on price;  and 
 
(iii) before shipment begins, the licensee shall post on a website93 the follow-
ing information: 
 
– the quantities being supplied to each destination as referred to in 
indent (i) above;  and 
 
– the distinguishing features of the product(s) referred to in in-
dent (ii) above; 
 
(c) the exporting Member shall notify94 the Council for TRIPS of the grant of the 
license, including the conditions attached to it.95  The information provided 
shall include the name and address of the licensee, the product(s) for which the 
license has been granted, the quantity(ies) for which it has been granted, the 
country(ies) to which the product(s) is (are) to be supplied and the duration of 
the license.  The notification shall also indicate the address of the website re-
ferred to in subparagraph (b)(iii) above. 
 
3. Where a compulsory license is granted by an exporting Member under the system 
set out in this Decision, adequate remuneration pursuant to Article 31(h) of the TRIPS 
Agreement shall be paid in that Member taking into account the economic value to the 
importing Member of the use that has been authorized in the exporting Member.  Where a 
                                                
92 [Fn. 6] This subparagraph is without prejudice to Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
93 [Fn. 7] The licensee may use for this purpose its own website or, with the assistance of the WTO Secre-
tariat, the page on the WTO website dedicated to this Decision. 
94 [Fn. 8] It is understood that this notification does not need to be approved by a WTO body in order to 
use the system set out in this Decision. 
95 [Fn. 9] The notification will be made available publicly by the WTO Secretariat through a page on the 
WTO website dedicated to this Decision. 
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compulsory license is granted for the same products in the eligible importing Member, the 
obligation of that Member under Article 31(h) shall be waived in respect of those products 
for which remuneration in accordance with the first sentence of this paragraph is paid in 
the exporting Member. 
 
4. In order to ensure that the products imported under the system set out in this Deci-
sion are used for the public health purposes underlying their importation, eligible import-
ing Members shall take reasonable measures within their means, proportionate to their 
administrative capacities and to the risk of trade diversion to prevent re-exportation of the 
products that have actually been imported into their territories under the system.  In the 
event that an eligible importing Member that is a developing country Member or a least-
developed country Member experiences difficulty in implementing this provision, devel-
oped country Members shall provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and con-
ditions, technical and financial cooperation in order to facilitate its implementation. 
 
5. Members shall ensure the availability of effective legal means to prevent the impor-
tation into, and sale in, their territories of products produced under the system set out in 
this Decision and diverted to their markets inconsistently with its provisions, using the 
means already required to be available under the TRIPS Agreement.  If any Member con-
siders that such measures are proving insufficient for this purpose, the matter may be re-
viewed in the Council for TRIPS at the request of that Member. 
 
6. With a view to harnessing economies of scale for the purposes of enhancing purchas-
ing power for, and facilitating the local production of, pharmaceutical products: 
 
(a) where a developing or least-developed country WTO Member is a party to a 
regional trade agreement within the meaning of Article XXIV of the GATT 
1994 and the Decision of 28 November 1979 on Differential and More Favour-
able Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries 
(L/4903), at least half of the current membership of which is made up of coun-
tries presently on the United Nations list of least-developed countries, the ob-
ligation of that Member under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement shall be 
waived to the extent necessary to enable a pharmaceutical product produced 
or imported under a compulsory license in that Member to be exported to the 
markets of those other developing or least-developed country parties to the re-
gional trade agreement that share the health problem in question.  It is under-
stood that this will not prejudice the territorial nature of the patent rights in 
question; 
 
(b) it is recognized that the development of systems providing for the grant of re-
gional patents to be applicable in the above Members should be promoted.  To 
this end, developed country Members undertake to provide technical coopera-
tion in accordance with Article 67 of the TRIPS Agreement, including in con-
junction with other relevant intergovernmental organizations. 
 
7. Members recognize the desirability of promoting the transfer of technology and ca-
pacity building in the pharmaceutical sector in order to overcome the problem identified 
in paragraph 6 of the Declaration.  To this end, eligible importing Members and exporting 
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Members are encouraged to use the system set out in this Decision in a way which would 
promote this objective.  Members undertake to cooperate in paying special attention to the 
transfer of technology and capacity building in the pharmaceutical sector in the work to be 
undertaken pursuant to Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, paragraph 7 of the Declara-
tion and any other relevant work of the Council for TRIPS. 
 
8. The Council for TRIPS shall review annually the functioning of the system set out in 
this Decision with a view to ensuring its effective operation and shall annually report on 
its operation to the General Council.  This review shall be deemed to fulfil the review re-
quirements of Article IX:4 of the WTO Agreement. 
 
9. This Decision is without prejudice to the rights, obligations and flexibilities that 
Members have under the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement other than paragraphs (f) 
and (h) of Article 31, including those reaffirmed by the Declaration, and to their interpreta-
tion.  It is also without prejudice to the extent to which pharmaceutical products produced 
under a compulsory license can be exported under the present provisions of Article 31(f) 
of the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
10. Members shall not challenge any measures taken in conformity with the provisions 
of the waivers contained in this Decision under subparagraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of Article 
XXIII of GATT 1994. 
 
11. This Decision, including the waivers granted in it, shall terminate for each Member 
on the date on which an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement replacing its provisions 
takes effect for that Member.  The TRIPS Council shall initiate by the end of 2003 work on 
the preparation of such an amendment with a view to its adoption within six months, on 
the understanding that the amendment will be based, where appropriate, on this Decision 
and on the further understanding that it will not be part of the negotiations referred to in 
paragraph 45 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1). 
 
 
ANNEX 
 
Assessment of Manufacturing Capacities in the Pharmaceutical Sector 
 
 Least-developed country Members are deemed to have insufficient or no manufac-
turing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector. 
 
 For other eligible importing Members insufficient or no manufacturing capacities for 
the product(s) in question may be established in either of the following ways: 
 
(i) the Member in question has established that it has no manufacturing ca-
pacity in the pharmaceutical sector; 
 
  OR 
 
(ii) where the Member has some manufacturing capacity in this sector, it has 
examined this capacity and found that, excluding any capacity owned or 
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controlled by the patent owner, it is currently insufficient for the pur-
poses of meeting its needs.  When it is established that such capacity has 
become sufficient to meet the Member's needs, the system shall no longer 
apply. 
 
 
Fisher & Rigamonti South Africa Case Study 
 
 
 
 
- 48 - 
 
 
 
Exhibit 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNAIDS, Report of the Executive Director, 2000-2001, Doc. No. UN-
AIDS/PCB(12)/02.2, 33 (May 3, 2002) 
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Exhibit 17 
 
 
The Global Fund – Pledges as of Oct. 20, 2004 
 
 
TOTAL PLEDGES TO DATE DONOR 
AMOUNT IN USD PERIOD 
TOTAL PAID 
(USD) 
Countries      
Andorra USD 100'000                 100'000   2002                  100'000  
Australia AUD 25'000'000            17'416'875   2004-2006             13'827'500  
Austria EUR 1'000'000              1'075'900   2002               1'075'900  
Barbados USD 100'000                 100'000   2003                  100'000  
Belgium EUR 41'183'222            48'365'501   2001-2007             29'707'866  
Burkina Faso USD 75'000                   75'000   2002                    75'000  
Cameroon USD 100'000                 100'000   2003                   
USD 100'000'000          100'000'000   2002-2005           100'005'530  Canada 
CAD 70'000'000            55'118'110   2005                   
China USD 10'000'000            10'000'000   2003-2007               4'000'000  
Denmark DKK 295'000'000            44'795'810   2002-2004             44'795'810  
EU EUR 460'500'000          557'749'291   2001-2006           451'837'961  
France EUR 550'000'000          674'956'619   2002-2006           305'498'491  
Germany EUR 300'000'000          363'224'518   2002-2007             95'367'375  
Greece EUR 250'000                 307'882                               
Hungary USD 10'000                   10'000   2004                    10'000  
Iceland ISK 15'000'000                 206'299   2004                  206'299  
Ireland EUR 30'000'000            33'295'430   2002-2004             33'295'430  
USD 200'000'000          200'000'000   2002-2003           215'160'273  Italy 
EUR 200'000'000          246'305'419   2004-2005                   
Japan USD 259'993'443          259'993'443   2002-2004           246'520'013  
Kenya KES 653'550                     8'273   2001                      8'273  
Korea USD 500'000                 500'000   2004                   
Kuwait USD 1'000'000              1'000'000   2003               1'000'000  
Liberia USD 25'000                   25'000                      
USD 100'000                 100'000   2002                  100'000  Liechtenstein 
CHF 100'000                   77'190   2004                    77'190  
Luxembourg EUR 4'000'000              4'497'320   2002-2004               4'497'320  
Mexico USD 100'000                 100'000   2003                   
Monaco USD 88'000                   88'000   2002-2003                    88'000  
Netherlands EUR 135'000'000          162'372'322   2002-2005             99'564'440  
New Zealand NZD 2'250'000              1'359'200   2003, 2004               1'359'200  
Niger USD 50'000                   50'000                      
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Nigeria USD 10'000'000            10'000'000   2002-2003               9'080'914  
Norway NOK 373'300'000            53'536'383   2002-2004             53'536'383  
Poland USD 30'000                   30'000   2003-2004                    30'000  
Portugal USD 1'000'000              1'000'000   2003-2004               1'000'000  
Russia USD 20'000'000            20'000'000   2002-2006               8'750'000  
Rwanda USD 1'000'000              1'000'000                      
Saudi Arabia USD 10'000'000            10'000'000   2003-2006               5'000'000  
Singapore USD 1'000'000              1'000'000   2004-2008                  200'000  
South Africa ZAR 20'000'000              3'039'814   2003               2'000'000  
Spain USD 100'000'000          100'000'000   2003-2006             50'000'000  
Sweden SEK 616'000'000            75'195'191   2002-2004             75'195'191  
USD 10'000'000            10'000'000   2002-2003             10'000'106  Switzerland 
CHF 3'000'000              2'343'384   2004               2'343'384  
Thailand USD 5'000'000              5'000'000   2003-2007               2'000'000  
Uganda USD 2'000'000              2'000'000                      
United Kingdom GBP 259'000'000          452'131'963   2001-2007           178'581'238  
United States2 USD 1'969'480'000       1'969'480'000   2001-2008           982'725'000  
Zambia ZMK 83'500'000                   25'000   2002                    25'000  
Zimbabwe USD 158'462                 158'462   2003                  158'462  
Total           5'499'313'599         3'028'903'549  
Foundations and Not-for-profit Organizations                    
Gates Foundation USD 150'000'000          150'000'000   2002-2003           150'000'000  
Int'l Olympic Committee USD 100'000                 100'000   2001                  100'000  
Other                                                                                                 105'967  
Total              150'100'000            150'205'967  
Corporations                      
Eni S.p.A. USD 500'000                 500'000   2002                  500'000  
Winterthur USD 1'000'000              1'000'000   2002               1'044'225  
Other                                                                                                   32'325  
Total                  1'500'000                1'576'550  
Individuals, Groups & Events                                  
Mr. Kofi Annan USD 100'000                 100'000   2001                  100'000  
Amb. D. Fernandez USD 100'000                 100'000   2001                  100'000  
Health Authorities of Taiwan USD 2'000'000              2'000'000   2002, 2004               1'000'000  
Real Madrid Soccer Match USD 112'487                 112'487   2002                  112'487  
Treatment Action Campaign USD 10'000                   10'000   2003                    10'899  
Other - pledged USD 50'000                   50'000   2003                    50'000  
Other - unpledged                                                                                                 750'562  
Total                  2'372'487                2'123'948  
         
Grand Total           5'653'286'086         3'182'810'014  
 
Source: The Global Fund, http://www.theglobalfund.org/ 
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Exhibit 18 
 
 
Aspen Pharmacare (South Africa), Stock Quotes 1995 - 2004 
 
 
 
Merck (U.S.), Stock Quotes 1995 – 2004 (for comparison) 
 
 
 
Source: BigCharts.com (October 13, 2004) 
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Exhibit 19 
 
 
 
Media Releases by the South African Competition Commission 
 
 
COMPETITION COMMISSION 
MEDIA RELEASE NO. 29 OF 2003 
16 October 2003 
 
Competition Commission finds pharmaceutical firms in contravention of the Competi-
tion Act 
 
The Competition Commission has found that pharmaceutical firms GlaxoSmithKline 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd (GSK) and Boehringer Ingelheim (BI) have contravened the Compe-
tition Act of 1998. The firms have been found to have abused their dominant positions in 
their respective anti-retroviral (ARV) markets. 
 
In particular the Commission has found the firms have engaged in the following restric-
tive practices: 
 
1. Denied a competitor access to an essential facility 
2. Excessive pricing 
3. Engaged in an exclusionary act 
 
The Commission has decided to refer the matter to the Competition Tribunal for determi-
nation. 
 
Menzi Simelane, Commissioner at the Competition Commission, says," Our investigation 
revealed that each of the firms has refused to license their patents to generic manufactur-
ers in return for a reasonable royalty. We believe that this is feasible and that consumers 
will benefit from cheaper generic versions of the drugs concerned. We further believe that 
granting licenses would provide for competition between firms and their generic competi-
tors." 
 
"We will request the Tribunal to make an order authorising any person to exploit the pat-
ents to market generic versions of the respondents patented medicines or fixed dose com-
binations that require these patents, in return for the payment of a reasonable royalty. In 
addition, we will recommend a penalty of 10% of the annual turnover of the respondents' 
ARVs in South Africa for each year that they are found to have violated the Act." 
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Simelane said these practices violate the Competition Act of 1998's prohibitions against 
excessive pricing (section 8(a)), refusing access to essential facilities (section 8(b)) and ex-
clusionary acts that have an anticompetitive effect that outweighs technological, efficiency 
or other pro-competitive gains (section 8(c). 
 
"Indeed the very goals of our Competition Act - promoting development, providing con-
sumers with competitive prices and product choices, advancing social and economic wel-
fare and correcting structural imbalances - have been made difficult in this context by the 
refusal of the respondents to license patents." 
 
The original complaint in this matter was filed by Hazel Tau and others alleging that GSK 
and BI were charging excessive prices to the detriment of consumers for their patented 
ARV medicines. 
 
GSK and BI hold patents on certain antiretroviral (ARV) medications used to treat 
HIV/AIDS.  GSK holds patents in South Africa on AZT (branded as Retrovir), Lamivudine 
(branded as 3TC) and AZT/Lamivudine (branded as Combivir).  BI holds patents in South 
Africa on Nevirapine (NVP) (branded as Viramune). 
 
* * * 
 
 
COMPETITION COMMISSION 
MEDIA RELEASE NO. 33 OF 2003 
16 December 2003 
 
Competition Commission Concludes an agreement with pharmaceutical firm 
 
The Competition Commission has concluded a settlement agreement with pharmaceutical 
firm GlaxoSmithKline South Africa (Pty) Ltd (GSK) and is in discussions with Boehringer 
Ingelheim (Pty) Ltd (BI) regarding a settlement agreement. 
 
The settlement agreement is the result of negotiations following the Commission's an-
nouncement in October 2003 that GSK and BI had, in its view, contravened the Competi-
tion Act of 1998. From its investigation into the complaints by Hazel Tau and others, the 
Commission concluded that GSK and BI had abused their dominant positions in their re-
spective anti-retroviral (ARV) markets.  This was denied by GSK and BI. 
 
The Competition Commissioner, Menzi Simelane, said he was happy that all parties con-
cerned had agreed to the terms of the settlement agreements as he believed that the 
agreements addressed the competition concerns raised by the Commission. 
 
"The terms of the agreements are substantially similar to the successful outcomes which 
we would have hoped to achieve at hearings before the Tribunal, namely the issuing of 
licenses to generic manufacturers of antiretroviral drugs. It has been a particularly difficult 
case and we are happy that the matter has been amicably resolved." 
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Simelane said the Commission had not asked for the imposition of a fine or an administra-
tive penalty. 
 
"We think it is far more important to have broadened access to cheaper ARVs for people 
with HIV/AIDS through price reductions by generic manufacturers. The introduction of 
generic substitutes should result in a drastic reduction in the prices of antiretroviral drugs. 
 
"As the agreements provide for more than one generic manufacturer, there will be compe-
tition amongst them, which should push prices even lower.  GSK will be making financial 
sacrifices by licensing the ARVs to generic manufacturers at a royalty rate of only 5%, for 
both the public and private sector. GSK has also reduced Aspen Pharmacare's royalty by 
25% and it will retain all the royalties at the same 5%." 
 
In terms of the settlement agreement GSK has undertaken to: 
 
- extend the voluntary licence granted to Aspen Pharmacare in October 2001 in respect of 
the public sector to include the private sector;  
- grant up to three more voluntary licences on terms no less favourable than those granted 
to Aspen Pharmacare, based on reasonable criteria  which include registration with the 
Medicines Control Council and the meeting of safety and efficacy obligations;  
- permit the licensees to export the relevant antiretroviral drugs to sub-Saharan African 
countries; 
- where the licensee does not have manufacturing capability in South Africa , GSK will  
permit the importation of the drugs for distribution in South Africa;  
- permit licensees to combine the relevant ARV with other antiretroviral medicines; and  
- charge royalties of no more than 5% of the net sales of the relevant ARVs. 
 
* * * 
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Exhibit 20 
 
 
 
Financial Mail (South Africa) 
November 21, 2003, Page 18 
 
Glaxo Battle Comes to SA 
 
By Claire Bisseker 
 
 
 
 A two-year battle waged internationally 
by the California-based Aids Healthcare 
Foundation (AHF) against GlaxoSmithKline 
(GSK) has moved to SA soil. AHF is leading a 
class action suit against the drug giant on 
behalf of local people with Aids. 
 
 The action brings to a head a long-
standing dispute between the two organisa-
tions, in which AHF has brought several legal 
petitions against GSK in the US. It has tried to 
have the patents on the drugs AZT and 3TC 
set aside, has petitioned the US Food & Drug 
Administration to withdraw approval for 
GSK's antiretroviral (ARV) drug Trizivir and 
has filed a false advertising suit against GSK. 
 
 None of these legal challenges has 
borne fruit, but in May AHF successfully lob-
bied major GSK shareholders in the US to vote 
down GSK CEO Jean-Pierre Garnier's US$ 
36m pension package. It argued that the 
amount could provide ARVs to more than 
100000 Ugandans for a year. 
 
 Last week AHF president Michael 
Weinstein announced in Durban that the non-
profit organisation would seek civil damages 
against GSK on behalf of South Africans who 
could not afford ARVs because of GSK's an-
ticompetitive pricing policies. 
 He says AHF will drop the class action 
if Glaxo establishes a R1bn fund to treat peo-
ple with Aids. AHF treats more than 12000 
people in its HIV clinics worldwide. 
 
 Its case is buoyed by the competition 
commission's finding earlier this month that 
GSK has abused its dominant market position 
by pricing its ARVs too high. Though only the 
competition tribunal can make a legal ruling, 
Weinstein says AHF is announcing its inten-
tion to launch a civil suit now so as to put 
pressure on GSK to settle the matter favoura-
bly out of court. 
 
 Last week, GSK hit back. In a statement, 
it accused AHF of launching legal challenges 
against it "in retaliation" for GSK's failure to 
meet its demands for big donations. Weinstein 
says that more than a year ago, GSK offered 
AHF $ 1m in response to a request for dona-
tions, but he turned down the amount as it 
was "ridiculously small" (given that GSK's 
sales of ARVs amount to $ 2bn/year) and 
because "it would have bought AHF's silence". 
Last month he asked GSK to donate $ 50m 
worth of ARVs for developing countries, but 
the company declined. 
 
 "I have no shame in asking GSK for 
money to help us help our patients," says 
Weinstein. "We get free drugs from Boe-
hringer Ingelheim and Gilead but Glaxo, with 
its huge PR apparatus, has tried to slander us 
for looking for money." 
Fisher & Rigamonti South Africa Case Study 
 
 
 
 
- 56 - 
 
 GSK official Vicki Ehrich says "it is a 
tragedy that an organisation with almost no 
investment in SA should attempt to distract 
the attention of all concerned and divert valu-
able resources from the needs of those affected 
by HIV." 
 
 
